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1. ALA'is MoRIsSEITrE, Ironic, on JAGGED LrrTLE PILL (Maverick Recording Co.
1995). The irony in prohibiting same-gender marriages has been noted from
several different perspectives. See, e.g., James Trosino, American Wedding:
Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REV. 93
(1993)(equating many prejudices against same-gender marriages with prejudices
against interracial marriages); Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Less Perfect Union,
N.Y. TIam, May 26, 1996, at Ell (noting the irony of using DOMA as a measure
to protect states' rights). See also infra section IU.A.
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VII. Conclusion ............................................ 977
I. INTRODUCTION
With a rarely matched haste and a calculated display of power,
Congress confidently placed its political credibility on the line and
passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).2 DOMA "relaxes" the
constitution, 3 makes a sacrificial offering of federalism, 4 repudiates
the separation of powers doctrine,5 and has little or no constitutional
authority to support its enactment.6 Nevertheless, Congress deter-
mined that the threat of same-gender marriages necessitated such
action.7
2. "[Tlhis bill's consequences are not adequately analyzed .... In a rational legisla-
tive atmosphere... [congressional] committees would be holding hearings... so
that we would not have to use ignorance as an excuse for haste." H.R. REP. No.
104-664, at 42 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2945.
DOMA has two basic provisions:
§ 2(a) No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a mar-
riage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe,
or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1997).
§ 3(a) In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any rul-
ing, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus
and agencies of the United States, the word "marriage" means only a
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and
the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is hus-
band or a wife.
1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West Supp. 1997).
3. The House Report calls DOMA a "narrow, targeted relaxation of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause." H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 28 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.CA.N. 2905, 2932.
4. "[DOMA intrudes... into a traditional domain of the states." The Defense of
Marriage Act: Hearings on S. 1740 Before the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary,
104th Cong. 44-45 (1996)[hereinafterHearings](statement of Prof. Sunstein). See
also 142 CONG. REC. S5931 (daily ed. June 6, 1996)[hereinafter Testimony
1](statement of Prof. Tribe); Tribe, supra note 1, at Ell.
5. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 6 & n.16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.N. 2905,
2910 (calling the Hawaii Supreme Court's interpretation of the Hawaii Constitu-
tion's Equal Rights Amendment a "clearly erroneous interpretation" based on
statements by one member of the Hawaii Legislature); id. at 24-30, reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.CA.N. 2905, 2928-34 (making clear that one purpose of DOMA is to
dictate to the courts proper judicial interpretation). See also Testimony I, supra
note 4, at 85932 (testimony of Prof. Tribe)(stating that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause "includes no congressional power to prescribe that some acts, records and
proceedings that would otherwise be entitled to full faith and credit under the
[clause] as judicially interpreted shall instead to be entitled to no faith or credit
at all!").
6. Testimony I, supra note 4, at 85932 (statement of Prof. Tribe).
7. H.R. REP. No. 104-664 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.N. 2905. But cf. Hear-
ings, supra note 4, at 44 (statement of Prof. Sunstein).
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DOMA was enacted in response to a 1993 Hawaii Supreme Court
decisions that many feared would result in the legalization of same-
gender marriages. Calling this decision the "greatest breakthrough"
in the legal assault against marriage, Congress acknowledged that the
United States Constitution 9 and various legal doctrinesiO could allow
same-gender couples to travel to Hawaii, get married, and then return
home with valid marriage licenses." DOMA supporters argued legis-
lation was needed to "combat" this result.12
DOMA grants to states an exemption from the mandate of the Full
Faith and Credit Clausei 3 so that a state can ignore a same-gender
8. In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that prohibitions on same-sex mar-
riages constituted a suspect gender classification. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44
(Haw. 1993). The case was remanded to determine the government's justifica-
tions for the classification. The decision on remand was issued by the trial court
on December 3, 1996, after DOMA had been enacted. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-
1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
9. Specifically, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the right to travel, and the right to
marry would require recognition of the same-gender marriage in another state.
See, e.g., Thomas M. Keane, Note, Aloha, Marriage? Constitutional and Choice of
Law Arguments for Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 47 STAN. L. REV. 499
(1995).
10. The various legal doctrines include the following: Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act (extinguishing public policy exceptions in favor of predictability, permanence,
and stability of marriage), lex celebrationis (providing presumptive validation of
marriages based on the law of the state in which they were performed), validation
statutes (providing per se validation of all marriages from other states), conflict of
law doctrine (creating a presumption favoring the validity of the marriage that is
likely to be strong depending on the interests involved), choice of law doctrine
(perhaps still applying the law of the state in which the marriage was con-
tracted), and the unreliability of public policy exceptions (likely to be narrowly
construed).
11. "[There is a burgeoning body of legal scholarship-some of it inspired directly by
the Hawaiian lawsuit-to the effect that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does
mandate extraterritorial recognition of 'marriage' licenses given to homosexual
couples." H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 9 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2905, 2913. For a discussion of various legal principles suggesting same-sex mar-
riages should be presumed valid in other states, see Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex
Marriage and Choice-of-Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When
We Return Home?, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 1033; Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex
Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?: Full Faith and Credit and Due Pro-
cess Limitations on States' Choice of Law Regarding the Status and Incidents of
Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii's Baehr v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J.
FAm. L. 551 (1994); Keane, supra note 9; Note, In Sickness and in Health, In
Hawaii and Where Else?: Conflict of Laws and Recognition of Same-Sex Mar-
riages, 109 HARv. L. REV. 2038 (1996).
12. Numerous war metaphors were used in the House Report that accompanied
DOMA. H.R. REP. No. 104-664 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905.
13. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State; And the Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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couple's valid marriage license issued by another state.14 Addition-
ally, DOMA refuses to recognize and denies all federal benefits to any
state-created legal marriage rights involving same-gender couples.' 5
Regardless of whether Hawaii or any other state adopts same-gender
marriage laws by legislation, referendum, or judicial decision, DOMA
declares that these laws will not be honored.16
Under different circumstances, DOMA would represent an eviscer-
ation of political and constitutional principles. It reflects a calculated
confidence that sufficient public hostility toward same-gender mar-
riages supports such congressional overreaching and not only will be
overlooked, but applauded as a necessary "strategy" to protect Ameri-
cans from the threat of same-gender marriages.
This Comment examines the efforts of gays and lesbians to obtain
marital rights and the resistance these efforts have encountered.' 7
An examination of the law demonstrates that prohibitions on same-
gender marriages are unconstitutional at both the federal and state
level, particularly with regard to the principle of equal protection.'S
Part H of this Comment begins with a discussion of the interests
that marriage serves for the individual citizen and society in general.
This Part makes clear that gay and lesbian couples are similarly situ-
ated to heterosexual couples with respect to marriage rights. Then,
because most arguments against same-gender marriage focus on his-
tory and tradition, Part III offers an alternative view that suggests
history and tradition actually advocate recognition of same-gender
marriages. History and tradition also illustrate many principles that
render bans on same-gender marriages unconstitutional. Part IV dis-
cusses the due process and equal protection problems that pervade the
law and the role these problems play in bans on same-gender mar-
riages. Part V builds on this discussion by documenting the constitu-
tional problems that surround DOMA, while Part VI analyzes the
interests advanced by DOMA. This analysis demonstrates that
DOMA conflicts with the interests in marriage, family, and children,
14. 28 U.S.C-A § 1738C (West Supp. 1997); 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West Supp. 1997).
15. 28 U.S.C- § 1738C (West Supp. 1997); 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West Supp. 1997).
16. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1997); 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West Supp. 1997).
17. The Author uses the labels gay and lesbian loosely to reflect individuals who
struggle against gender roles as determinants of rights and privileges.
18. State prohibitions on same-gender marriages are governed by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, which provides that "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. MV, § 1, cl. 4. If a federal classification contravenes
the equal protection guarantee, generally the result is a due process violation of
the Fifth Amendment. JoHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CoNsTITUTIoNAL
LAw § 14.1, at 596 (5th ed. 1995). See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 224 (1995)(holding that equal protection analysis under the Fifth
Amendment is the same as under the Fourteenth Amendment); Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
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despite DOMA supporters' assertions to the contrary. In the end,
DOMA is unconstitutional because it serves as a classification for its
own sake and fails to serve a legitimate government purpose.19
II. PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS
The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
2 0
Most Americans seem to agree with the United States Supreme
Court that marriage is an essential ingredient for happiness. A 1992
survey reported that seventy-eight percent of senior high school stu-
dents indicated that a good marriage and family life was an "ex-
tremely important" goal.2 1 Of the fourteen life goals that students
were asked to rank, a good marriage and family life ranked as the
number one goal overall. 22 Similarly, a 1989 survey of adults reported
that a happy marriage was again the number one life goal of those
polled.23
A. Securing the Blessing of Liberty
[Als an American citizen, a law-abiding, taxpaying-major taxpaying-citi-
zen,... I should be allowed the same rights, the same pursuit of happiness
that every other citizen enjoys. Whatever they want to call it.... As long as
we have the same legal benefits and protections for me, and for my family-
my family. That's all. 2 4
"Marriage is a state conferred legal... status,"2 5 a necessary pre-
requisite in our society to the formation of a recognized "family."2 6
Family status can be obtained in only two ways-legally through mar-
riage or adoption or as a result of a blood relationship. Without access
to marriage, gays and lesbians are incapable of creating for them-
selves a "recognized" family unit. Consequently, gays, lesbians, and
19. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
20. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
21. Norval D. Glenn, Values, Attitudes, and the State of American Marriage, in
PROMISES TO KEEP: DECLINE AND RENEWAL OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 15, 20-21
(David Popenoe et al. eds., 1996)(reporting a survey by the Institute for Social
Research, University of Michigan).
22. Id.
23. Id. (reporting a Massachusetts Mutual American Family Values Study).
24. We're a Family and We have Rights, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1996, at 54 (interview
with musician Melissa Etheridge who, along with her lesbian partner of eight
years, had their first child in February 1997).
25. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993).
26. Throughout this Comment, the term "family" is used to refer to committed, inter-
dependent relationships with or without children. This use acknowledges that
two adults alone may comprise a family.
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the children of gays and lesbians are denied many privileges and pro-
tections associated with family membership. 2 7
No other arrangement, whether by contract or domestic partner-
ship, is capable of producing the same quality of life as the ability to
participate in a legally recognized family unit through marriage.28
"'[The family unit does not simply co-exist with our constitutional sys-
tem,' but 'is an integral part of it,' for our 'political system is superim-
posed on and presupposes a social system of family units, not just of
isolated individuals. No assumption more deeply underlies our soci-
ety. .. .'-29 Despite the compelling nature of a citizen's interests in
marriage and family, the law excludes gays and lesbians from this
fundamental aspect of human life.
Marriage and family serve a number of functions critical to both
individuals and society.3 0 The government confers numerous benefits
and protections on a marriage and a family because of the important
and varied role these institutions play in the well-being of individuals
and society as a whole. Family units allow individuals to "intertwine
their energy and resources to accomplish individual and group
goals."31 The family is the central and "primary unit that provides the
resources and social support needed to navigate life."32 Family mem-
bers care for each other and are committed to shared interests.3 3
Many tasks can be handled more effectively and productively when
combined.34 Family units provide stability and permanence in the or-
dering of a society and provide both individuals and society the great-
est potential for prosperity.
27. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993)(listing state-provided privileges
and protections of marriage). The federal government, of course, provides many
more privileges and protections. "The word 'marriage' appears in more than 800
sections of federal statutes and regulations, and the word 'spouse' appears more
than 3,100 times." H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 10 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C-A.N. 2905, 2914.
28. See Jennifer L. Heeb, Comment, Homosexual Marriage, the Changing American
Family, and the Heterosexual Right to Privacy, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 347, 391
(1993)(arguing that the limited scope of these alternatives illustrates the inher-
ent unfairness of precluding gay and lesbian marriages); Mark Strasser, Domes-
tic Relations Jurisprudence and the Great, Slumbering Baehr: On Definitional
Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interests, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
921, 965 & n.342 (1995).
29. LAURENCE H. TamE, AmRIuAN CoNsTrruTIoNAL LAw 1414 (2d ed. 1988)(citing
Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and its Critics, 53
B.U. L. REv. 765, 772-73 (1973)).
30. See, e.g., Janet Z. Giele, Decline of the Family: Conservative, Liberal, and Femi-
nist Views, in PROMSES TO KEEP, supra note 21, at 89.
31. Arland Thornton, Comparative and Historical Perspectives on Marriage, Divorce,
and Family Life, in PROMnSES TO KEEP, supra note 21, at 69, 80.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 81.
34. See id.
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the importance of
marriage and family to both individuals and society. In Smith v. Or-
ganization of Foster Families,3 5 the Court recognized the importance
of families to individuals in "the emotional attachments that derive
from the intimacy of daily association."3 6 In Griswold v. Connecti-
cut,3 7 the Court acknowledged that the family unit is protected be-
cause it contributes so powerfully to the happiness of individuals.
Family associations meet the human need for closeness, trust, and
love.3 8 The Griswold Court noted that the decision to marry is pro-
tected precisely because marriage "is an association that promotes a
way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilat-
eral loyalty, not commercial or social projects."39 In Boddie v. Con-
necticut,4 0 the Court emphasized that "marriage involves interests of
basic importance in our society."4 1 Even "[elmployers depend on fami-
lies to give the rest, shelter, emotional support and other maintenance
of human capital that will motivate workers and make them
productive."42
For individuals, marriage and family status convey a full range of
rights, benefits, and protections, including financial subsidies such as
tax credits, the ability to share resources such as health insurance and
social security or pension benefits, and economies of scale. In turn,
these resources promote economic and emotional security and stabil-
ity for family members. Within a legally recognized family, individu-
als are capable of drawing resources into the family as a unit, and
these resources often can survive changes in the status of individual
members. In the event one individual loses some protection, the fam-
ily unit can rely on resources from another individual family member
to provide security and stability.
Marriage also facilitates the acquisition and sharing of wealth.
Property can be acquired and shared without tax consequences, and
shared property, like shared resources, can be used more efficiently
and productively.4 3 Additionally, marriage is capable of protecting
the assets that individuals have acquired together. Assets acquired
by either member of the marriage become part of the family's com-
bined resources until no eligible member of the family remains. This
offers security throughout life's changes and minimizes instability
35. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
36. Id. at 844.
37. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
38. TRIBE;, supra note 29, at 1418.
39. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
40. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
41. Id. at 376.
42. Giele, supra note 30, at 89, 108.
43. See Thornton, supra note 31, at 81.
[Vol. 76:924
ATTACK ON DOMA
that might otherwise be caused by disruptions when assets are not
easily transferable between individuals or cannot be shared.
The ability to share and transfer resources is a necessary element
of economic interdependence. Individual interdependence reduces
economic burdens on society. When disruption occurs, i.e., unemploy-
ment, family members are often capable of bearing this burden with-
out reliance on outside resources. Moreover, married individuals have
greater incentives to be productive, to acquire wealth, and to benefit
others by sharing that wealth.
The legal status associated with "family" allows access to loved
ones in cases of emergency and the ability to speak for family mem-
bers when they cannot speak for themselves. Legal status provides
both adults in the family unit the ability to react quickly in any medi-
cal emergency involving their children. Legal status presents a rela-
tionship structure to all third parties-employers, doctors, lawyers,
other family members, and society as a whole.
Contrary to general perceptions, the same-gender marriage move-
ment is not led by the political leaders of the "gay rights" movement,44
many of whom share an ambivalence toward the traditional institu-
tion of marriage.4 5 Others do not view marriage as a worthwhile
goal.46 Instead, the struggle for gay marriage rights has been pro-
pelled largely by individual couples, often those who already are 'iv-
ing in virtual marriages" and raising children 47 and who seek to
protect their family unit in the legal context. For these couples, mar-
riage is necessary to secure legal status for their "family" and their
children, which often requires access to the benefits, privileges, and
protections that only legal status can provide.
44. See Gabriel Rotelo & E.J. Graff, To Have and to Hold: The Case for Gay Mar-
riage, NATIoN, June 24, 1996, at 11.
45. See id. See also William N. Eskridge Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA.
L. REV. 1419, 1486-93 (1993)(describing three arguments that gays and lesbians
make against the value of same-gender marriages: (1) marriage is a terrible in-
stitution based on patriarchy, (2) assimilation is not desirable, and (3) it could
lead to fractionalization in the gay community, that is, some gays and lesbians
have more to gain by same-gender marriages than others based on their social
status); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage A Path to Liberation?, re-
printed in SuzANNE SHErmAN, LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE: PRIVATE CO MMT-
imNTs, PuBLic CERmioNms 20 (Suzanne Sherman ed., 1992); Nancy D. Polikoff,
We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will
Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV.
1535 (1993).
46. See generally Rotelo & Graft, supra note 44, at 11.
47. Joseph P. Shapiro & Stephen Gregory, Kids with Gay Parents: As Lawmakers
Battle Gay Marriages, a Look at How the Children Fare, U.S. NEws & WoRLD
REP., Sept. 16, 1996, at 75. See Barbara Kantrowitz, Gay Families Come Out,
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1996, at 50.
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B. Promoting the General Welfare
Marriage and family benefit society in an infinite number of
ways. 48 The conflict over same-gender marriages is not a zero-sum
game. Instead, each marriage and family is part of a system in which
the prosperity and well-being of the whole system depends on the
prosperity and well-being of each of its parts. The institutions of mar-
riage and family should be viewed as a unifying force with shared
goals relating to the well-functioning of each part.49 System unifica-
tion is essential to avoid individual elements working independently
of one anotherO toward separate and often conflicting goals.51
Marriage and family have little value as mechanisms for prefer-
ring certain classes of individuals over others or for granting rights
and benefits denied to others. The critical function of marriage and
family suggests far more can be gained by same-gender marriages
than what opponents of same-gender marriages argue will be lost.52
Gay families are capable of serving the same functions and promoting
the same values and interests as traditional families.5 3 Government
supports, protects, and promotes families because these units benefit
society. Extending the benefits and protections associated with mar-
riage and family to same-gender couples very well may be necessary to
the well-being of the country.
Marriage and family are the primary vehicles by which individuals
care for themselves and others. Society benefits when its members
are capable of taking care of themselves. To achieve these goals, mar-
riage and family throughout history5 4 have existed in many diverse
forms,55 not limited by biology. 5 6 While opponents of same-gender
marriages rely on history and tradition to advocate against same-gen-
48. See generally Giele, supra note 30, at 107.
49. Ironically, the strongest and most dire criticism leveled against DOMA is its frac-
tional effect. By diluting or relaxing the full faith and credit mandate, which is
intended to be a unifying force under the federal system, DOMA undermines the
Clause by returning the states to the status of "independent foreign sovereign-
ties, each free to ignore rights and obligations created under the laws or estab-
lished by the judicial proceedings of the others." Testimony I, supra note 4, at
S5931 (statement of Prof. Tribe)(citing Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S.
430, 439 (1943)). This is in sharp contrast to the Supreme Court's description of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause as a "nationally unifying force" in which each
state is "an integral part of a single nation, in which rights ... established in any
[state] are given nationwide application." Id. at S5931-32.
50. TRiBE, supra note 29, at 1433 n.88 (quoting Thomas C. Grey, Eros, Civilization
and the Burger Court, 43 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 83, 97 (1980)).
51. But cf Eskridge, supra note 45; Ettelbrick, supra note 45; Polikoff, supra note 45.
52. See generally Giele, supra note 30.
53. See Thornton, supra note 31, at 78-82.
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 81. See also Retying the Knot, NATION, June 24, 1996, at 17 ("[Very
little about marriage is historically consistent enough to be traditional.... Each
[Vol. 76:924
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der marriages, history demonstrates that marriage has not always in-
volved only two adults5 7 or carried religious connotations,5 8 or been
recognized legally.5 9 Instead, marriage and family, in all its diverse
forms, has worked well throughout history to serve the needs of the
particular time.60
Public policy debates that focus on ethnocentric assumptions of the
superiority of one family form over another are deleterious to the pub-
lic welfare.6 1 It is the family functioning, that is, the nurturing of
family values and the interests served by families, that affects the
quality of family life, not the form of the family. 62 Such abilities are
neither confined wholly to one type of family structure nor to heter-
osexuals, but instead to the capabilities, resources, and goals of the
individuals that form the family unit. Many different family forms
can perform these functions 63 and society should be more interested in
spreading these important capabilities, rather than in confining
them.6 4
Furthermore, many stresses placed on nontraditional families
stem from their continued marginalization by a society that fails to
accept them as legitimate and sees them as undeserving of equal sup-
port. These stress factors are then projected upon families of same-
gender couples as inherent attributes, characteristics, or limitations of
that family, rather than as the product of outside harms. 65
In many ways, same-gender marriages simply reflect a larger so-
cial trend. The nature of American families continually changes.6 6 A
era's marriage institutionalizes the sexual bond in a way that makes sense for
that society, that economy, that class.").
57. See Retying the Knot, supra note 56, at 17 ("Then forget the patriarch Jacob,
whose two wives and two concubines produced the heads of the twelve tribes.");
Thornton, supra note 31, at 78-82.
58. See Retying the Knot, supra note 56, at 17. See also Richard Ante, Same-Sex
Marriage and the Construction of Family: An Historical Perspective, 15 B.C.
THmD WoRLD L.J. 421 (1995)(reviewing JoHN BOSWELL, SANE-SEx UNIoNs IN
PREMODERN EUROPE (1994)); Eskridge, supra note 45.
59. See Retying the Knot, supra note 56, at 17 ("Forget centuries of European prole
"marriages" conducted outside the law, in which no property was involved.").
60. Thornton, supra note 31, at 78-82.
61. See id. at 79-80. See also Todd D. Robichaud, Defense Of Marriage-Or Attack
On Family?, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 30, 1996, at A24.
62. See, e.g., Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996). See also Giele, supra note 30, at 103.
63. Thornton, supra note 31.
64. Giele, supra note 30.
65. Id. Cf. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996
WL 694235, at *17 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996)(concluding that while children of
nontraditional households may experience stress, the available scientific data
suggest they tend to adjust and develop in a normal fashion).
66. The traditional definition of family now comprises only 27% of this nation's 9.1
million households. Strasser, supra note 28, at 981 & n.466 (citing Ron-Christo-
pher Stamps, Comment, Domestic Partnership Legislation: Recognizing Non-
1997]
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1995 Harris survey shows that the general population has accepted
diverse family forms as normal.6 7 Only three percent defined family
as the traditional nuclear family.6S In Berger v. State,69 the New
Jersey Supreme Court recognized that children biologically unrelated
to their nuclear family did not negate that they lived and functioned
as a family. Likewise, in City of White Plains v. Ferraioli,70 New
York's highest court held that a zoning ordinance could not limit the
definition of family to exclude a household that is a family in every
sense except biological.
A limited view of marriage directly contradicts the importance of
family, both to the individuals concerned and to society as a whole.71
The functionality and prosperity of "family life," regardless of its form
or structure, should be an important national concern. 72 "The most
promising social policies for families and children take their direction
from inclusive values that confirm the good life and well-being of every
individual as the ultimate goal of the nation."73 Instead of asking how
to exclude participants in the family unit, the better question is "how
do society and the state support stable households in a world where
the composition of families is changing, and how might same-gender
relationships contribute to that end[.]" 74
Traditional Families, 19 S.U. L. REv. 441, 441-42 (1992)). See also Martha F.
Riche, The Future of the Family, Am. DEMOGRAPHICS, March 1991, at 44 (stating
that as of 1991, the number of American families fitting the traditional family
structure had decreased to only 22%).
67. Giele, supra note 30, at 104. See also Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL
694235, at *17 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996)("[There is diversity in the structure
and configuration of families. In Hawaii, and elsewhere, children are being
raised by their natural parents, single parents, step-parents, grandparents,
adopted parents, hanai parents, foster parents, gay and lesbian parents, and
same-sex couples. There are also families in Hawaii, and elsewhere, which do not
have children as family members.").
68. Giele, supra note 30, at 104.
69. 364 A.2d 993 (N.J. 1976).
70. 313 N.E.2d 756, 758-59 (N.Y. 1974).
71. Giele, supra note 30, at 103-04.
72. Thornton, supra note 31, at 79.
73. Giele, supra note 30, at 109. See also Getting Marriage Straight: Excluding Ho-
mos No Way To Do So, ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 1996, at 20; Let Them Wed, ECONO-
MIST, Jan. 6, 1996, at 13.
74. Fenton Johnson, Wedded to an Illusion: Do Gays and Lesbians Really Want the
Right to Marry?, HARPER'S MAG., Nov. 1996, at 50. Opponents of same-gender
marriages believe such marriages would be a radical and untested step. In fact,
every postindustrial nation is considering same-gender marriages. In 1996, a
majority of the Dutch Parliament promoted legislation permitting homosexual
marriage, which would affect all members of the European Union: British gays
could marry in Amsterdam and claim spousal status in England. William Safire,
If Hawaiian Example Holds Sway, Same-Sex Marriage Getting Near, GREENS-
BORO NEws & REC., May 5, 1996, at F4. Several countries already have enacted
same-gender marriage laws. Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitu-
tional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 7-8 & nn.8-15.
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III. HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF
When writing or interpreting the law, good character is more important than
knowing the detail of case law or being prepared to argue that case in court.
Courage, respect, consideration, kindness and a willingness to act when the
odds are against you, define the outline of character.... The opinion of men is
sometimes wrong, very wrong. Our duty is to rise when we know it is so, and
declare for truth.75
Far from opposing same-gender marriages, history and tradition
suggest something is terribly wrong with the arguments used to op-
pose same-gender marriages, arguments that are similar to those
used to prohibit interracial marriages. 76 States were free to forbid in-
terracial marriages until 1967, when the United States Supreme
Court held in Loving v. Virginia77 that such prohibitions violated the
Equal Protection Clause. When defending the constitutionality of the
Virginia antimiscegenation statute, the State argued such prohibi-
tions were constitutional because both whites and blacks were prohib-
ited from marrying members of another race. The Supreme Court
rejected this argument, holding that antimiscegenation laws imper-
missibly infringed on an individual's right to marry and choose their
spouse with no compelling government justification.7 8 Key to under-
standing the importance of Loving v. Virginia was the Court's rejec-
tion of the ideology of white supremacy. 79
A. Tradition of Prejudice
Many crimes and injustices have been committed... in the name of God and
virtue.8 0
The primary interest asserted by the government to support legis-
lative bans on mixed-race marriages was the majoritarian morality.
Interracial marriages were believed to be immoral and unnatural and
as such inevitably would lead to moral and social decline. 8 ' One court
75. Senator Robert Kerrey, 1996 Commencement Address, University of Nebraska
College of Law, in NEBRASKA T RAsca'r, Fall 1996, at 6 (Senator Kerrey, D-
Neb., was one of 14 Senators who voted against DOMA).
76. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67-68 (1993)(concluding that the substitution of
"sex" for "race" is the only difference between prohibitions on same-gender mar-
riages and prohibitions on interracial marriages); Ante, supra note 59, at 436-39;
Trosino, supra note 1, at 93; Strasser, supra note 28, at 969-70.
77. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Wbile the Supreme Court could have relied on the Equal Pro-
tection Clause to strike down the bans on interracial marriages, this case is more
notable for advancing a due process right to marry.
78. Id. at 11-12.
79. Id. at 11 (Stewart, J., concurring)("lThe racial classifications must stand on their
own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy."). See
also Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race
and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REv. 263 (1995).
80. URVASHI VAID, ViRTuAL EQuALITY 377 (1995).
81. Id.
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stated that "such connections never elevate the inferior race to the
position of the superior, but they bring down the superior to that of
the inferior. They are productive of evil, and evil only, without any
corresponding good."82
Many white Americans believed it was God's truth that whites
were superior to blacks, that racial mixing was an abomination to
God, and such mixing would result in serious social harms.8 3 Interra-
cial marriages, it was argued, were immoral because God did not in-
tend for the races to mix8 4 based on purported proof of the "biological"
difference between whites and blacks.85 In 1877, the reasoning was
expressed this way: "there can not [sic] be any tyranny or injustice in
requiring both alike, to form this union with those of their own race
only, whom God hath joined together by indelible peculiarities [sic],
which declare that He has made the two races distinct."8 6 These
moral arguments conclude that marriage is defined by nature, and
hence, cannot be defined differently.8 7
Today, the biological fact that God made the sexes different is the
justification for moral proscriptions against same-gender marriages,8 8
which is the same argument advanced to prohibit interracial mar-
riages.8 9 During prohibitions on interracial marriages, whites were
viewed as superior to blacks.90 Today, it is assumed that heterosexu-
als are superior to homosexuals. "Granting" rights to the inferior or
flawed group grants them a legitimacy that the superior group does
not believe they deserve and does not want them to have.9 1
82. Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869).
83. Trosino, supra note 1, at 100.
84. "Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he
placed them on separate continents .... The fact that he separated the races
shows that he did not intend for the races to mix." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
3 (1967)(quoting the Virginia trial court's opinion upholding the antimiscegena-
tion statute).
85. Id.
86. Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 195 (1877). See also Trosino, supra note 1, at 108-11
(categorizing social justifications against same-gender marriages as analogous to
social justifications for prohibiting interracial marriages).
87. Professor Lynn Wardle uses definitional arguments against same-gender mar-
riages. See Wardle, supra note 74, at 38.
88. Today the argument goes this way: "[W]e need only reflect on this central, unim-
peachable lesson of human nature: We are, each of us, born a man or a woman."
H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 13 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2917.
89. See Eskridge, supra note 45 (outlining social construction of definitional argu-
ments); Strasser, supra note 28, at 921-34. See also Trosino, supra note 1, at 98-
102.
90. Trosino, supra note 1, at 99-100.
91. Representative Henry Hyde, Chairperson of the Judiciary Committee, described
the need for DOMA: "[Slame-sex marriage,... approved by the law, legitimates
a public union, a legal status that most people . . . feel ought to be illegiti-
mate...." H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2905, 2920.
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During the debate over civil rights for blacks in 1864, the argu-
ment went this way:
Now, what does all this mean but mixed schools and perfect social equality? It
is nothing more or less; and the next step will be that they will demand a law
allowing them, without restraint, to visit the parlors and drawing-rooms of
the whites, and have free and unrestrained social intercourse with your un-
married sons and daughters. It is bound to come to that-there is no disguis-
ing the fact; and the sooner the alarm is given and the people take heed the
better it will be for our civilization. 9 2
Arguments against same-gender marriages sound the same alarm.
Professor Richard Duncan recently argued that same-gender mar-
riages would "endorse the 'tragic illusion' that a same-sex relationship
is no different than the union of a man and a woman."9 3 Professor
Duncan added that same-sex marriage,
which is at odds with what most people in this society believe-is certain to
have many unintended (perhaps intended by some) consequences. For exam-
ple, if marriage laws are amended to encompass homosexual couples, will pub-
lic education be affected? Almost certainly it will. Curriculum used to teach
children about human sexuality and family life will need to be revised to re-
flect the new paradigm. Books like "Heather Has Two Mommies"... designed
to teach young children that homosexuality is just one more kind of love-will
become required texts in public.., schools. 9 4
Those who argue against same-sex marriages, like those who ar-
gued against interracial marriage, propose that these inferior couples
provide an unsuitable environment in which to raise children.95 In
upholding a conviction under a state antimiscegenation statute, a
court justified the need for the statute: "The amalgamation of the
races is not only unnatural, but is always productive of deplorable re-
sults. Our daily observation shows us, that the offspring of these un-
natural connections are generally sickly and effeminate, and that they
are inferior in physical development and strength, to the full-blood of
either race."9 6 In 1871, one judge concluded that prohibitions against
interracial marriages were justified "[tlo prevent violence and blood-
shed which would arise from such cohabitation, distasteful to our peo-
ple, and unfit to produce the human race in any of the types in which
it was created."97
92. Alfred Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth Amendment: The
Original Intent, 52 VA. L. REv. 1224, 1250 (1966)(citing CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong.,
1st Sess. 841 (1864))(recounting an 1864 debate between Senator James H. Lane
of Kansas and Senator Willard Saulsbury of Delaware).
93. Richard F. Duncan, Homosexual Marriage and the Myth of Tolerance: Is Cardi-
nal O'Connor a "Homophobe"?, 10 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. PoL'Y 587,
595 (1996).
94. Id.
95. Trosino, supra note 1, at 99-100, 110-11.
96. Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869).
97. Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 287, 299-300 (1871).
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In the 100 years prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Loving,
only one state court struck down prohibitions against interracial mar-
riages as unconstitutional. 98 In Perez v. Lippold,99 a California court
declared marriage "a fundamental right of free men" that cannot be
prohibited absent "an important social objective and by reasonable
means."1 0 0 To be constitutional, legislation regulating marriage
"must be based upon more than prejudice and must be free from op-
pressive discrimination."101
As the United States Supreme Court would later do in Loving, the
Perez court rejected the state's contention that a law did not discrimi-
nate against any racial group because it applied equally to both races.
"The right to marry is the right of individuals, not of racial groups."102
"Since the essence of the right to marry is freedom to join in marriage
with the person of one's choice, a segregation statute for marriage nec-
essarily impairs the right to marry."1 0 3 Rejecting the practical justifi-
cations for bans on interracial marriages, the court stated that "[it is
no answer to say that race tension can be eradicated through perpetu-
ation by law of the prejudices that give rise to the tension."10 4
In Perez, the State also argued that "Negroes are socially inferior
... and that the progeny of a marriage between a Negro and a Cauca-
sian suffer not only the stigma of such inferiority but the fear of rejec-
tion by members of both races." 105 The court replied, "[ilf they do, the
fault lies not with their parents, but with the prejudices in the com-
munity and the laws that perpetuate those prejudices by giving legal
force to the belief ... ."106 The court concluded that the State failed to
offer a compelling justification for the antimiscegenation law. 0 7
The concurring opinion specifically responded to the State's conten-
tion that the couple's children might be ostracized by society.
98. See Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). See also Trosino, supra note 1, at
102-07.
99. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
100. Id. at 19.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 20.
103. Id. at 21.
104. Id. at 25. See also Trosino, supra note 1, at 105 n.85 ("The court also rejected the
state's argument 'that persons wishing to marry in contravention of race barriers
come from "the dregs of society" and that their progeny will therefore be a burden
on the community.'" (citation omitted)).
105. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 26 (Cal. 1948).
106. Id.
107. For many years progress was slow in the dissipation of the insecurity
that haunts racial minorities, for there are many who believe that their
own security depends on its maintenance. Out of earnest belief, or out of
irrational fears, they reason in a circle that such minorities are inferior
in health, intelligence, and culture, and that this inferiority proves the
need of the barriers of race prejudice.
Id. (emphasis added).
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[Tihat is something which the state is powerless to control and which it can-
not prevent by legislation. It therefore furnishes no basis for legislation,
either. It is something resting with the parties themselves, for them to decide.
If they choose to face this possible prejudice and think that their own pursuit
of happiness is better subserved by entering into this marriage with all its
risks than by spending the rest of their lives without each other's company
and comfort, the state should not and cannot stop them. 108
It was not until 1967 that the United States Supreme Court fol-
lowed the prophesy of the Perez court and struck down prohibitions
against interracial marriages. The Supreme Court declared that
"[miarriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man."10 9 The Court
characterized marriage as a "fimdamental freedom" that 'has long
been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the or-
derly pursuit of happiness by free men."1 10 "To deny this fundamental
freedom on so unsupportable a basis.., is surely to deprive all the
State's citizens of liberty. . . ."111
B. Separate and Not Equal
The test of [freedom's] substance is the right to differ as to things that touch
the heart of the existing order.1 12
Given the interests at stake, it is not surprising that for the last
twenty years same-gender couples have been turning to lower courts
to legitimize their marriages. Lower courts, however, universally
have held that prohibitions on same-gender marriage violate neither
the Due Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause.113 Oppo-
nents of same-gender marriages acknowledge that the Due Process
108. Id. at 33 (Carter, J., concurring). Accord Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
109. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)(Jackson,
J.).
113. See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995)(concluding that it
made no difference whether the marriage statute discriminated against a gay
couple when the sameness of their gender prevents them from entering into mar-
riage in the first place); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. Ct. App.
1973)(holding that same-sex couples are incapable of entering into marriage as
that termed is defined); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185-86 (Minn. 1971),
cert. dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)(concluding that it was unrealistic to conclude
the drafters of the state marriage statute would have used the term to mean
anything other than marriage between individuals of the opposite sex); Singer v.
Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974)(stating that the marriage stat-
ute was "clearly founded upon the presumption that marriage, as a legal relation-
ship, may exist only between one man and one woman'). But cf. City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985)("It is plain that the electo-
rate as a whole, whether by referendum or otherwise, could not order.., action
violative of the Equal Protection Clause."); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60 n.20(Haw. 1993)(That the legislature, in enacting [the marriage statute], obviously
contemplated marriages between persons of the opposite sex is not.., outcome
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Clause protects every individual's right to marry;"l 4 nevertheless,
these same opponents insist no such right exists for homosexuals.X1 5
A different level of abstraction is invoked to suggest marriage means
something different when applied to homosexual citizens because ho-
mosexual marriages are not so rooted in history and tradition that
bans on same-gender marriage deny a homosexual individual any lib-
erty interest.' 1 6
A similar argument was offered and rejected by the Supreme Court
in Loving v. Virginia,"i7 in which the Court found it irrelevant that
interracial marriages were not rooted in history or tradition. In strik-
ing down the antimiscegenation law, the Loving Court upheld the sub-
stantive due process right of every individual to marry the person of
choice."i 8 The state cannot infringe upon this right unless it is neces-
sary to accomplish some permissible government objective,ii 9 one
that is neither arbitrary nor reflective of invidious discrimination.' 20
To conclude homosexual marriages are not so rooted in history or tra-
dition is to apply a different level of abstraction than was applied in
Loving.
Courts also have attempted to distinguish the equal protection
holding in Loving from equal protection challenges against prohibi-
tions on same-gender marriages. Singer v. Hara'2 i is a typical exam-
ple. In Singer, a Washington court held that denying two men the
dispositive .... Legislative action, whatever its motivation, cannot sanitize con-
stitutional violations.").
114. Wardle, supra note 74, at 28-39. See also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78
(1987)(unanimously extending the fundamental right recognized in Zablocki v.
Redhail to prison inmates, striking down a virtual ban on marriage for prison
inmates); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)(arguably establishing a consti-
tutional right to marry).
115. Wardle, supra note 74, at 28-39.
116. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993)(recognizing that prohibitions
on same-gender marriages implicated the Equal Protection Clause, but reasoning
there was no fundamental right of persons of the same sex to marry because
same-sex marriage was neither rooted in Hawaii's traditions nor implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty such that failure to recognize the interest would result
in the sacrifice of liberty or justice), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225
(Haw. 1993). Substantive due process includes those fundamental liberties that
are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937). Also incorporated within this test are liberties "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition." Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977).
117. 388 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1967).
118. Id. at 12.
119. Id. at 11. Loving involved a racial classification and so the Court applied strict
scrutiny, which required the government to justify the classification based on a
compelling interest. The Court concluded that there was no such interest.
120. The term "invidious" means arbitrary, irrational, and not reasonably related to a
legitimate purpose. BLAcies LAw DICTIONARY 826 (6th ed. 1990).
121. 522 P.2d 1187, 1191 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
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right to marry did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The court
reasoned that
[i]n Loving... the parties were barred from entering into the marriage rela-
tionship because of an impermissible... classification.... [Two men] are not
being denied entry into the marriage relationship because of their sex; rather,
they are being denied entry into the marriage relationship because of the rec-
ognized definition of that relationship as one which may be entered into only
by two persons who are members of the opposite sex. 12 2
The court's reasoning in Singer illustrates the circular use of defini-
tional arguments to justify bans on same-gender marriages. 123 Yet, a
definitional justification to an equal protection or due process chal-
lenge offers no support for denying same-gender marriages because
the definition of marriage itself is being challenged.
Despite the Singer court's conclusory statement, the two men were
prohibited from marrying based on their sex. The logical result of the
court's argument is that the classification is permissible because it ap-
plies equally to both genders. Yet, this argument was rejected by the
Loving Court. To argue that the prohibition against interracial mar-
riages applied equally to both races "'represents a limited view of the
Equal Protection Clause.'"'124 Instead, the Equal Protection Clause
examines the distinctions made by the classification and whether such
distinctions are necessary to achieve a legitimate government pur-
pose, not resting on discrimination alone.
At the time of Loving, prohibitions on interracial marriages were
considered permissible classifications.125 For many of the same rea-
sons, prohibitions on same-gender marriages are believed to be per-
missible classifications. Prohibitions on interracial marriages existed
for a long time before it became well-recognized that these prohibi-
tions were justified by impermissible motivations. Modern recognition
of suspect discrimination rests on a long evolution of consciousness
about unequal and unnecessary dividing practices that serve no legiti-
mate purpose and fail to reflect an individual's capacity to contribute
to a family or to society.12 6 Even today many Americans still believe
122. Id. at 1192.
123. See also Eskridge, supra note 45, at 1427-32 (describing how courts employ defi-
nitional arguments to reject constitutional challenges to prohibitions of same-
gender marriages); Strasser, supra note 28, at 922-34.
124. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967)(quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964)).
125. In Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883), the Supreme Court upheld a conviction
under an Alabama statute forbidding adultery or fornication between a white
person and an African-American and imposed a greater penalty than a statute
proscribing similar conduct by members of the same race, finding no equal protec-
tion violation.
126. The "most celebrated footnote in constitutional law," footnote 4 in United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), essentially predicted that
legislation involving suspect classifications would require a more intense scrutiny
by the courts. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 CoLUM. L.
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interracial marriages are flawed or inferior. 12 7 Yet, most Americans
no longer believe that personal distaste for interracial marriages is a
sufficient justification for restricting one's choice of marriage partners.
Opponents of same-gender marriages offer additional reasons for
why the race classification in Loving is inapposite to the analogy of
same-gender marriages. Discrimination based on race provides a
valid rights-based argument because blacks are victimized for who
they are. Discrimination against homosexuals does not because they
are victimized for what they do. Opponents manipulate lines between
status and conduct to justify denying rights-based arguments to
homosexuals.1 28 In reality, discrimination against homosexuals is di-
rected at who they are as much as at what they do.129 It is homosex-
ual identity or status that "links discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation with discrimination on the basis of race or sex."1so
'"[O]rientation is a matter of one's inner life and not merely one's outer
conduct. Orientation encompasses desires, fantasies, thoughts, urges,
and drives that one often cannot prevent or control-even if one can
resist these impulses in one's external behavior."131 Heterosexuals,
like homosexuals, experience these same emotions. Heterosexuality,
like homosexuality, is a sexual orientation status. The issue then be-
comes whether government can prefer one orientation over
another.132
The Loving analogy demonstrates that Americans have a history of
believing that certain marriage dyads are superior to others. Yet, just
as they were incapable of supporting bans on interracial marriages,
definitional arguments are incapable of supplying the legitimate pur-
pose needed to support bans on same-gender marriages. Even if het-
REv. 1087 (1982). See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967)("The present
statutory scheme dates from the adoption of the Racial Integrity Act of 1924,
passed during the period of extreme nativism which followed the end of the First
World War.").
127. While prohibitions against interracial marriages were held unconstitutional in
1967, a 1991 Gallup Poll of white Americans found that 45% disapprove of inter-
racial marriage.
128. [Clivil Rights are reserved for "legitimate" and "deserving minorities."
Religious conservatives argue that gay people do not qualify as a legiti-
mate minority because we do not face the same discrimination or have
the same experience as racial minorities; that because homosexuality is
a sexual behavior, it is a moral issue, not an issue of justice or rights;
and that gay rights constitute the legitimation of homosexuality and
therefore bestow a "special" status on gay people.
VAID, supra note 80, at 328.
129. See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH.
L. REv. 203, 217 (1996).
130. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreward: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REv.
4, 62 (1996).
131. Amar, supra note 129, at 217-18.
132. See id. at 218.
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erosexual marriages are superior or even optimal, that justification
alone cannot support restrictions on same-gender marriages. To sug-
gest discrimination against homosexuals is legitimate because it is not
exactly like racial discrimination ignores the obvious and is counter-
productive. This reasoning requires discrimination to deteriorate be-
yond a level of intolerance and inequality that courts have required in
the past. Further, the argument fails because the concept of suspect
discrimination is not something that lends itself to being fully settled
in advance.
When examining the treatment of homosexuals under the law, the
question should be-what does "equal" require in this particular con-
text? 3 3 The answer necessarily involves recognition of a wide range
of values and interests. Current debates over homosexuality still re-
flect linear or hierarchial discussions of superiority or inferiority. The
focus of these debates is the need to deny "equality" to homosexuals to
discourage homosexual behavior and maintain the superiority of het-
erosexual behavior. When the Supreme Court struck down bans on
interracial marriages in Loving v. Virginia, it repudiated the theory
that interracial marriages between blacks and whites threatened
white supremacy.13 4 In essence, prohibitions on same-gender mar-
riages reflect a similar theory that such marriages threaten the supe-
riority of heterosexuality.
Professor Laurence Tribe has suggested that a theory of antisubju-
gation rather than antidiscrimination better serves equal protection
analysis.135 The antisubjugation principle aims to break down legally
created or legally reenforced systems of subordination that treat some
people as second-class citizens.' 3 6 "When the legal order that shapes
and mirrors our society treats some people as outsiders or as though
they were worth less than others, those people have been denied the
equal protection of the laws."13 7 The "'citizenship clause of the four-
teenth amendment ... does not allow for degrees of citizenship': no
citizen is 'more equal' than any other."' 3 8
133. See Cass R. Sunstein, General Propositions and Concrete Cases, 31 WAKE FOREST
L. Rsv. 369, 373 (1996). See also VAIm, supra note 80, at 336 (arguing that dis-
crimination against gays is best understood not as religious or moral, but as fun-
damentally antidemocratic notions based on authoritarian or even totalitarian
traditions); Heeb, supra note 28 (arguing that the proclamation of "difference"
undermines the principle of equal protection, which comes perilously close to con-
verting the doctrine of individual rights into a doctrine of class rights).
134. See discussion supra note 79.
135. TRIBE, supra note 29, at 1514-21.
136. Id. at 1515.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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Attempts to subordinate particular groups of citizens have ex-
tended well beyond race.13 9 Gender roles also have been used
throughout history to prescribe proper behavior, especially for women,
and to proscribe other wrongs or immoral behavior. In 1872, in
Bradwell v. Illinois,140 a case Professor Cass Sunstein has called one
of the three "genuinely humiliating decisions in American constitu-
tional law,"'141 the United States Supreme Court upheld an Illinois
statute that prohibited women from practicing law. Sunstein used the
concept of humiliation to describe public pronouncements about a cer-
tain group's role in society. This is reflected in Justice Bradley's con-
curring opinion explaining the prohibition.
[Tihe civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide differ-
ence in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or
should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity
and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is
founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates
the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and func-
tions of womanhood.
1 4 2
One commentator restated and then challenged Bradley's argu-
ment. "These laws did not seek to make women unequal; they simply
recognized God-given difference.... Today, of course, we know better,
and modern courts have indeed invalidated legislatively imposed, sta-
tus-based disabilities heaped upon women."14 3 Today, discrimination
based on sexual orientation simply reflects additional beliefs about
gender, and of correct behavior, with regard to assigned gender roles.
C. Tolerance but Not Equality
[W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding. 1 4 4
Some legal scholars argue that even though bans on same-gender
marriages may lack merit under the law, practical considerations may
suggest that the rights of homosexuals should be left to the majority
through the democratic process rather than to courts intervening to
uphold equal protection challenges.145 In short, the majority simply is
not yet ready for same-gender marriages. These practical arguments
suggest Americans should be allowed time to arrive at an understand-
ing of their own prejudices toward homosexuals. The authority of the
judiciary could be jeopardized if courts act in contravention of the ma-
139. Id. at 1518.
140. 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
141. Sunstein, supra note 130, at 70-71.
142. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872)(Bradley, J., concurring)(emphasis
added).
143. Amar, supra note 129, at 217.
144. Astor v. Wells, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 466, 474 (1819).
145. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 130, at 98-99.
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jority's position. Moreover, if courts act prematurely, opposition will
galvanize and lead to a strong movement for constitutional amend-
ments overturning judicial decisions, thereby jeopardizing important
interests. 4 6 Affirming rights of gays and lesbians could weaken the
antidiscrimination movement that is operating in democratic arenas
and could provoke increased hostility and even violence against
homosexuals.
Practical arguments also were used to justify the "separate but
equal" doctrine. In Plessy v. Ferguson,147 the second case in Sun-
stein's "humiliation trio,"'48 the Supreme Court held that it was rea-
sonable to act with reference to established usages, customs, and
traditions, with a view to the promotion of people's comfort, and to
preserve the public peace and good order.' 4 9 In Plessy, Homer Plessy,
who was seven-eights Caucasian and one-eighth African, a mixture
that was not discernable to him, insisted that he be allowed to sit in a
coach where white passengers were accommodated. Plessy insisted he
was entitled to every recognition, right, privilege, and immunity se-
cured to the white citizens of the United States by the Constitution.
In advancing the separate but equal doctrine and rejecting Plessy's
equal protection argument, the Court reasoned that
If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result
of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits and a volun-
tary consent of individuals .... "[Tihis end can neither be accomplished nor
promoted by laws which conflict with the general sentiment of the community
upon whom they are designed to operate."1 5 0
The impact discrimination has on the lives of gays and lesbians can
be better understood by comparing the doctrine of "separate but
equal" to the argument "tolerance but not acceptance."' 5 ' Professor
Wardle asserts that marriage rights for same-gender couples go be-
yond social tolerance and compel social approval.' 52 When gay and
lesbians fight for equal rights, it is characterized as a "demand for
special preferred status, not merely for tolerance."' 53 This argument
suggests certain rights are reserved for certain deserving members of
society who are preferred.154 Under this argument, there is no differ-
ence between not favoring and disfavoring; instead, those who are "not
146. Id. at 97.
147. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
148. Sunstein, supra note 130, at 70-71.
149. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896).
150. Id. at 551 (quoting People v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 448 (1883)).
151. See e.g., Wardle, supra note 75, at 58-62 (classifying the difference between toler-
ance and preference). Cf. Duncan, supra not 93 (suggesting that even tolerance is
too much).
152. Wardle, supra note 74, at 60.
153. Id. at 60.
154. Duncan, supra note 92, at 593.
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favored" simply should expect to be given fewer rights.155 Rights are
viewed as benefits that society can grant to some of its constituents
and can withhold from others, not as basic human rights.156
Hindsight illustrates the flaw in Wardle's reasoning. In upholding
the separate but equal doctrine and conviction in Plessy, the Court
emphasized that Plessy incorrectly insisted upon riding a coach used
by a race to which he did not belong.15 7 According to the Court, the
statute, which made Plessy's conduct criminal, was constitutional 5 8
because the purpose of the law was not to oppress a particular
class.' 5 9 Thus, enforced separation did not violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.160
In stark contrast, Justice Harlan's dissent emphasized that
Plessy's conduct should not be criminalized.
It is scarcely just to say that a colored citizen should not object to occupying a
public coach assigned to his own race. He does not object, nor, perhaps, would
he object to separate coaches for his race, if his rights under the law were
recognized. But he objects, and ought never to cease objecting to the proposi-
tion, that citizens of the white and black races can be adjudged criminals be-
cause they sit, or claim the right to sit, in the same public coach on a public
highway.1 6 1
Justice Harlan understood the resulting harms of the separate but
equal doctrine. Harlan refused to acknowledge that the purposes of
the doctrine could be justified by majority preferences, custom, or leg-
islative policy. 16 2
Just as the Plessy decision perpetuated the disguised harm facili-
tated by the separate but equal doctrine,163 practical arguments also
camouflage the impact discrimination has on the lives of gays and les-
155. "[Clivil rights are newly defined as a reward given by society for good behavior.
Such rights are deemed benefits that society grants to some of its constituents-
the deserving minorities-rather than as basic human rights and values." VAIn,
supra note 80, at 182. Under this articulation of civil rights doctrine, important
liberty interests are not broad and inalienable rights, but privileges that are
earned and rewarded. Id. Further, gays and lesbians have no rights until
supermajoritarian support manifests such rights. The problem with this argu-
ment is that gays and lesbians are not asking courts to announce new rights not
identifiable in the Constitution's text, but are asking for the same rights already
granted to all other citizens. Populism arguments manipulate constitutional
principles to define away gay and lesbian liberty and to jeopardize their right to
equal protection by characterizing them as a "suspect group" rather than a sus-
pect class. See Eskridge, supra note 45, at 1433.
156. VAID, supra note 80, at 182.
157. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 541, 549 (1895).
158. Id. at 550-52.
159. See id. at 551.
160. Id. at 548.
161. Id. at 561 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 558 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
163. TRIBE, supra note 29, at 1519 ("Perhaps the nineteenth century Louisiana
lawmakers who decided to minister to the sensibilities of their white constituents
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bians. While stability often is a good thing, an unjust system should
be made less stable.' 64 To the extent that law minimizes harm to the
lives of gays and lesbians, social turmoil inevitably will result. Thus,
the costs associated with practical arguments suggest this may be one
of those times when "judicial minimalism" could be a "blunder."65
Courts must address the issue of whether a statute is consistent with
the Constitution;' 66 it is the validity of the statutory purpose achieved
that must stand or fall. This is the role served by judicial review-to
ensure laws are consistent with the Constitution. Such a role cannot
be considered improper "judicial activism."' 67
D. Rights by Consent
Practical arguments suggest that minimal judicial interference
with the subjugation of gay and lesbians serves the purpose of
preventing social turmoil. This argument differs significantly from ar-
guments based on "constitutional populism."' 68 Constitutional popu-
lism advocates using the community's morality to legitimize
government actions. 16 9 That is, absent specific constitutional prohibi-
tions, the majority has a right to decide how all should live. Propo-
nents of this view fail to distinguish the "acceptable principle"-
political power is best entrusted to the majority-from the "unaccept-
able principle"-the majority can do whatever they will and is beyond
resistance.' 70
by mandating segregated railway coaches simply never gave a thought to how
this would affect Homer Plessy.").
164. See Sunstein, supra note 130, at 380.
165. Id. at 399.
166. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 558-59 (1895)(Harlan, J. dissenting).
167. "The framers of the Constitution knew... there is no more effective
practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than
to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a
minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door
to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and
choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus escape
the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger num-
bers were affected. Courts can take no better measure to assure that
laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation."
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,454 (1972)(quoting Railway Express Agency v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949)).
168. See D. Don Welch, Legitimate Government Purposes and State Enforcement of
Morality, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 67.
169. Id. at 68, 86 (stating that H.LA. Hart identified such a view as "moral
populism").
170. Id. at 86 & n.126 (citing H.LA. HART, LAw, LIBERTY, AND MoALIrrY (1963)). See
also RALPH KETCHAw, FRAMED FOR PosTEary: THE ENDLTMnG PHILOSOPHY OF
THE CONsTrrtrrioN 27 (1993)(stating that "republicanism" was the underlying
philosophy of the framers such that representatives made laws for the good of the
nation as a whole; democratic philosophy, as used by Aristotle, had come to mean
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Constitutional populism arguments used to justify bans on same-
gender marriage redefine rights to avoid implicating specific constitu-
tional prohibitions.371 By redefining rights as they relate to homosex-
uals, constitutional populists can deny homosexuals the same
constitutionally protected rights granted to other citizens.1 7 2 Without
a constitutionally protected interest, morality alone-irrebuttable
presumptions that homosexuality is unnatural and therefore im-
moral-serves as a sufficient rational basis for denying equal protec-
tion to homosexuals.173 Allowing same-gender couples to marry
would legitimize and thereby rebut contrary irrebuttable
presumptions.1 74
Yet, laws that create irrebuttable presumptions have been disfa-
vored under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments because the presumptions create arbitrary classifica-
tions.1 7 5 In Stanley v. Illinois,176 the United States Supreme Court
held that a state could not conclusively presume that an individual,
unwed father is unfit to be a parent. Instead, the Due Process Clause
required the state to provide a hearing on the issue of parental fit-
ness.1 77 Likewise in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,178 the
Supreme Court held that a state could not presume a teacher was in-
direct rule by the people, demagogy, turbulence, and majority tyranny, which was
rejected by the framers).
171. See discussion supra note 155.
172. See, e.g., Wardle, supra note 74, at 53-54.
173. It is essential to understand what the Constitution is, and what it is not.
It is the instrument by which the people created a government and in-
vested it with certain powers, directed to a specific end. The Constitu-
tion does not create any rights of, or grant any rights to, the people. It
merely recognizes their primordial rights, and constructs a government
as a means of protecting and preserving them.... [Tihe very first sec-
tion of the Constitution acknowledges that, by virtue of their species and
nothing more, all persons are free and equal, and possess certain natu-
ral, inherent, inalienable rights. These include, but are not limited to,
the enjoyment of life and liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and freedom
of expression ....
The purpose of the government born of the Constitution is to protect
these individual liberties, not to take them away.
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 502 (Ky. 1992)(Combs, J., concur-
ring)(stating that a criminal statute proscribing consensual homosexual sodomy
violates privacy and equal protection guarantees of the Kentucky Constitution).
174. In fact, a growing body of data rebuts the claimed presumption that homosexual-
ity is unnatural. See, e.g., id. at 489-90 (compiling a list of social, cultural, and
medical authorities who assert that homosexuality is a natural human
phenomenon).
175. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973)(holding that a state may not class-
ify as "out of state students" those who do not belong to that class based on a
presumption made by the state).
176. 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
177. Id.
178. 414 U.S. 632, 646 (1974).
[Vol. 76:924
ATTACK ON DOMA
capable of teaching merely because she was four or five months
pregnant.
The logic of the Court's holding in these cases seems correct given
the purpose of the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment-re-
jecting arbitrary classifications. Ultimately, constitutional populism
arguments have no credibility unless constitutional principles are
overhauled and the Equal Protection Clause ceases to have any
meaning.17 9
IV. I NOW PRONOUNCE YOU...
I can only hope.., the Court soon will reconsider its analysis and conclude
that depriving individuals of the right to choose for themselves how to conduct
their intimate relationships poses a far greater threat to the values most
deeply rooted in our Nation's history than tolerance of nonconformity could
ever do. Because I think the Court today betrays those values, I dissent. 1 8 0
Government has played a central role in perpetuating the
marginalization of gays and lesbians. Legislatures and courts have
relied on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Bowers v.
Hardwickl8l to justify violating homosexual's constitutional rights.
Though the Court's holding in Bowers did not involve an equal protec-
tion challenge, the case is used to deny homosexuals equal protection
of the laws. Not surprisingly, Bowers v. Hardwick is the third case in
Sunstein's "humiliation trio."182
Applying the reasoning in Bowers, it is argued that if homosexual
conduct can be criminalized, it would be anomalous to find that dis-
crimination against homosexuals violates equal protection guaran-
tees. If it is constitutionally permissible for a state to make
homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is constitutionally permissible
for a state to enact other laws disfavoring homosexuals.183
This argument has been criticized on several grounds. First, Bow-
ers held only that criminalization of sodomy did not offend substantive
due process.' 8 4 But, "[tihe Court explicitly refused to address the
179. Professor Welch argues that constitutional populism would preclude any judicial
review. Constitutional populism allows a court to read the element of legitimacy
out of its evaluation of the constitutionality of statutes because every statute's
means are rationally related to some end. Without the additional element of le-
gitimacy, no statute is capable of violating a rational basis test. Welch, supra
note 168, at 70-71, 79-86.
180. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 214 (1986)(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
181. 478 U.S 186 (1986).
182. Sunstein, supra note 130, at 70-71. See also VAID, supra note 80, at 134 ("[Bow-
ers] is to the growing gay rights movement what Plessy v. Ferguson was to the
civil rights movement and what Dred Scott v. Sandford was to the abolitionists.
Each of these decisions reflects the Court's failure to recognize the equal human-
ity and personhood of members of a minority group.").
183. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1631 (1996)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
184. Amar, supra note 129, at 231.
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equal protection issues at stake."l85 Second, this argument danger-
ously blurs the key constitutional difference between status and con-
duct.1 8 6 In his Romer dissent, Justice Scalia stated that "[i]f it is
rational to criminalize the conduct, surely it is rational to deny special
favor and protection to those with a self-avowed tendency or desire to
engage in the conduct. Indeed, where criminal sanctions are not in-
volved, homosexual 'orientation' is an acceptable stand-in for homo-
sexual conduct."1s 7
Professor Akhil Amar called this conclusion "one of the most troub-
ling passages ever to appear in modern [Supreme Court decisionsl."18 8
For starters, the word "special" in the first sentence is a cheat. The issue here
is the right of gays and his to have the same right against orientation discrimi-
nation enjoyed by heteros qua heteros. And unless all bets are off when
"homosexuals" are involved, the second sentence suggests that-as a matter
of general principle-orientation is an acceptable stand-in for conduct. But
Justice Scalia himself must know this is not the case, and so he qualifies his
claim with the phrase "where criminal sanctions are not involved." Why? Be-
cause otherwise, to use orientation as a stand-in a law would be an obvious
bill of attainder.1 8 9
The manipulation of conduct and status categories as applied to
gays and lesbians illustrates yet another way in which the law as ap-
plied to homosexuals is different than the law as applied to
heterosexuals.190
A. Stranger to Our Laws
In Bowers v. Hardwick,191 the Supreme Court held that no right to
privacy or intimate association could protect Michael Hardwick from
arrest and conviction for performing fellatio with another consenting
adult in the privacy of his own bedroom. The Court upheld this stat-
ute only as it applied to homosexuals. Even though the statute ap-
plied equally to heterosexuals,19 2 the Court refused to address
185. Id.
186. Id. at 230.
187. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1632 (1996)(Scalia, J., dissenting)(emphasis
added).
188. Amar, supra note 129, at 231.
189. Id. Professor Amar also notes that the bill of attainder principle is not limited to
criminal cases.
190. VMD, supra note 80, at 137 ("Nan Hunter is right to characterize the status-con-
duct distinction as an 'artifact of the categories of legal doctrine.' Homosexuality
is far more than a lifestyle, a status, or a sexual act for most of us who are gay.
Gayness is our identity, our life, our family, our being.").
191. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Michael Hardwick was convicted for performing fellatio,
which was not a crime at common law or under the statutes cited by Justice
White or Chief Justice Burger. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 549
(1993).
192. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
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whether these rights would protect heterosexual couples engaging in
the same behavior.193
Prior to Bowers, the Supreme Court frequently had recognized a
commitment to the fundamental right of privacy. 194 Despite this pre-
cedence, the Bowers Court refused to recognize privacy protections for
homosexuals. The rational for this contrary holding in Bowers rested
on Justice White's conclusion that there is "no connection between
family, marriage, or procreation" and "homosexual activity."' 95 Since
privacy rights largely have evolved from issues relating to the family,
White concluded it would be facetious even to suggest that two adult
homosexuals engaging in consensual sex in the privacy of their home
were involved in an intimate association protected by the Constitu-
tion.' 96 Thus, homosexuals have no "fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy."'197
Justice White's conclusion reflects a tendency to reduce gay or les-
bian identity to sex. Failure to see the homosexual as an individual
accounts for much of the arbitrary treatment gays and lesbians re-
ceive under the lawl 98 and ignores constitutional themes used to pro-
tect all other citizens.' 99
The Court's distinction between heterosexual and homosexual pri-
vacy rights and rights of intimate association is arbitrary for several
reasons. First, the Court's reliance on a long history of prohibitions on
sodomy was "beside the point."200 The Court had acknowledged in its
previous term that the "pure[st]' of 'common law pedigree[s]' cannot
ensure the continuing constitutional validity of long-practiced inva-
193. Shortly after Bowers, the Supreme Court declined to review Post v. State, 715
P.2d 1105, 1109 (0ka. Crim. App. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890 (1986). In
Post, a state appellate court had overturned a heterosexual sodomy conviction on
the ground that the federal constitutional right of privacy had been extended by
the Supreme Court "to matters of sexual gratification," at least with respect to
heterosexuals. Apparently the Court saw no conflict between the Post holding
and its holding in Bowers.
194. 'This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974). See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)(holding
that a state cannot criminalize the private possession of obscene materials in the
home, even though obscene materials are not protected by the First Amendment).
195. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
196. Id. at 194.
197. Id. at 190-93.
198. See Karst, supra note 79, at 319. See also Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat
Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for
Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MiAn L. REv. 511, 537-68 (1992).
199. Even conservative columnist George Will deemed the Court's distinction between
the sexual privacy at issue in Bowers and prior privacy rulings as unprincipled.
George F. Will, What "Right" to be Let Alone?, WAsH. PosT, July 3, 1986, at A23.
200. TRIBE, supra note 29, at 1427.
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sions of body or home."2 0 1 Neither "the length of time a majority has
held its convictions [nior the passions with which it defends them can
withdraw legislation from th[e] Court's scrutiny."2 02
In dissent, Justice Blackmun commented on the irony of the
Court's reliance on history as justification for the sodomy law.203 Not-
ing that the majority relied heavily on the longstanding prohibitions
against sodomy dating back to the drafting of the Constitution to jus-
tify the legitimacy of the statutes criminalizing the behavior, Black-
mun pointed out that the Court in Loving rejected history as a
justification for prohibitions on interracial marriages. 2 04 Indeed, reli-
ance on historical prohibitions would prohibit many currently pro-
tected activities such as divorce, contraception, abortion, and even
fornication.2 05 As Justice Blackmun noted, it is "revolting to have no
better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time
of Henry IV."206
Second, the Court has protected the freedom of personal choice in
matters relating to marriage and family under the right of privacy.2 07
The treatment of gays under DOMA would deprive them-and no one
else-of the freedom of personal choice in such matters. As the Court
noted in Eisenstadt v. Baird,208 the constitutionally protected right of
privacy inheres in the individual, not the marital couple. Eisenstadt
201. Id. (quoting Tennessee v. Gardner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)).
202. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 210 (1986)(Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 497 (Ky. 1992)("We view the United
States Supreme Court decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, as a misdirected applica-
tion of the theory of original intent. To illustrate: as a theory of majoritarian
morality, miscegenation was an offense with ancient roots. It is highly unlikely
that protecting the rights of persons of different races to copulate was one of the
considerations behind the Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, in Loving v.
Virginia, the United States Supreme Court recognized that a contemporary, en-
lightened interpretation of the liberty interest involved in the sexual act made its
punishment constitutionally impermissible." (citations omitted)).
203. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 210 & n.5 (1986)(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
204. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
205. Fornication is not constitutionally protected per se, but many states have
decriminalized fornication in spite of history and religion. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has extended privacy rights traditionally associated with the
family to intimate relationships outside of the marital context. See Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)(holding that to provide access to contraceptives to
married but not unmarried individuals who are similarly situated violates the
Equal Protection Clause).
206. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986)(Blackmun, J., dissenting)(quoting
Justice Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)). "[I]t
should be noted that Chief Justice Burger relied in his concurring opinion on the
first English statute criminalizing sodomy, which was enacted during the reign of
Henry VIII." TRIBE, supra note 29, at 1427 & n.50 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986)(Burger, C.J., concurring)).
207. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974).
208. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
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concerned a statute that granted only married persons access to con-
traceptives. The Court analyzed the statute's validity under the
Equal Protection Clause and looked for a rational basis to justify the
different privacy protections accorded to married and unmarried per-
sons under the statute.2 09 The Court held that if the state did not
restrict married individuals' access to contraceptives, then the state
could provide no justification for restricting the same access to unmar-
ried individuals. 21o Whatever rights an individual may have with re-
spect to accessing contraceptives, the rights must be the same for
unmarried and married individuals.211
Read in light of Bowers, Eisenstadt demonstrates that the right of
privacy is far broader for heterosexuals than it is for homosexuals.21 2
If in other cases the Court applied the same standard it used in Bow-
ers, the Court would not recognize many of the interests already in-
cluded in the right of privacy.213 For example, using contraceptives
could still be prohibited because the Eisenstadt Court found no funda-
mental right to obtain contraceptives. Instead, the right to access and
use contraceptives flows from the larger privacy right-an individual's
right to engage in and make choices about intimate sexual relations,
including freedom of procreative choice. 2 14 Thus, "[tihe essential 'lib-
erty'. . . surely embraces the right to engage in nonreproductive sex-
ual conduct that others may consider offensive or immoral."21 5 Yet,
Bowers denies this right to homosexuals.
The early twentieth century attack against contraceptive use is "al-
most word for word, the [same] charge hurled by every critic of homo-
sexuality-and for the same reasons."2 1 6 In Margaret Sanger's era,
contraception was blamed for perverting natural functions, perpetuat-
ing immorality, fostering egotism, and enervating self-indulgence.2 1 7
Dire social consequences were predicted.218 By the early twentieth
century, states had a long history of criminalizing the use of
contraceptives. 21 9
Courts could have concluded that it was anomalous to find that
discrimination against individuals who used contraceptives violated
equal protection guarantees. If it is constitutionally permissible for a
209. Id. at 447.
210. Id. at 453.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., Strasser, supra note 28.
213. Id. at 971-72 (concluding that the standard applied "would not have been met by
many of the interests already included within the right to privacy").
214. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
215. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 218 (1986)(Stevens, J., dissenting).
216. Rotelo & Graff, supra note 44, at 12.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Strasser, supra note 28, at 972.
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state to criminalize the use of contraception, surely it is constitution-
ally permissible for a state to enact other laws disfavoring individuals
who use contraception. Individuals who use contraceptives could be
classified separately from other citizens for different treatment under
the law based on their conduct and their status as "contraception
users." This analysis would be consistent with the narrow standard
applied in Bowers. Yet this limited application of the court's narrow
analysis has been reserved for homosexuals only.
Justice Blackmun argued that the Bowers majority applied the
wrong level of specificity in its analysis. "This case is no more about 'a
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy,'... than Stanley
v. Georgia was about a fundamental right to watch obscene movies
.... ,"220 In Stanley v. Georgia,2 2 1 the Supreme Court held that pri-
vate possession of obscenity in the home cannot be made criminal. Yet
the Bowers majority held that there was no privacy right to engage in
homosexual sodomy in the privacy of one's home.2 2 2 By characteriz-
ing the rights of homosexuals differently than the rights of heterosex-
uals, an anomaly results. Two homosexual men can watch a video
depicting sodomy in the privacy of their home, and they are constitu-
tionally protected. If the same two men actually engage in sodomy in
the privacy of their own home, however, they are not constitutionally
protected.2 23
The Bowers concurrence's reliance on religion is equally misplaced.
Throughout history, Judeo-Christian morality has condemned many
practices as immoral. To the extent states no longer punish such prac-
220. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986)(Blackmun, J., dissenting)(citation
omitted).
221. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
222. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
223. The impact of discrimination on the lives of homosexuals is especially dramatic in
relation to the facts in Bowers. Michael Hardwick was arrested and jailed for
behavior that had taken place in his home, a sanctuary afforded special protec-
tions under the Fourth Amendment. TRIBE, supra note 29, at 1424.
In [no setting] is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when
bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's
home-a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional
terms: "The right of the people to be secure in their.., houses ... shall
not be violated."
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980). In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 617 (1980), Justice White in dissent wrote that police procedures must at a
minimum "protect individuals against the fear, humiliation, and embarrassment
of being roused from their beds in states of partial or complete undress." Ironi-
cally, "Hardwick was watched, seized and handcuffed by police in his own bed-
room-the arresting officer refused even to leave the room or turn his back while
Hardwick and his companion dressed." TRIBE, supra note 29, at 1424-25. Never-
theless, Justice White, writing for the Bowers majority, "brushed aside" Hard-
wick's claim for sanctuary in his home. Id.
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tices, reliance on Judeo-Christian morality is arbitrary.2 2 4 Distinc-
tions based on homosexuality also lack evenhandedness. These
distinctions place moral burdens on one class of citizens, but not on
others. Even in states that still criminalize heterosexual sodomy,
heterosexuals can engage in sodomy and still marry. The only justifi-
cation for this distinction is to argue that the secondary effects of sod-
omy between two consenting homosexuals is different-more immoral
or harmful-than the effects of sodomy between two heterosexuals.
But this requires demonstration of a harmful effect to justify the disfa-
vored treatment of homosexuals based on morality, something the
Bowers Court said was unnecessary.2 25 But, the Court's precedent
usually has required a showing of harm to justify morality as a ra-
tional basis for laws.22 6
In Eisenstadt, the Supreme Court rejected the State's argument
that morality alone could justify prohibitions against an unmarried
individual's right to access contraceptives. 2 27 Instead, the Court held
that this rationale was dubious, particularly because prohibitions on
access to contraceptives by unmarried individuals would have little
effect on deterring fornication, the state's asserted objective.2 28
Again, in Carey v. Population Services International,22 9 the
Supreme Court held that when a state burdened a fundamental right,
its justification for the burden requires more than an unsupported as-
sertion. Both parties in Carey conceded that no evidence supported
the conclusion that teenage sexual activity increases in proportion to
the availability of contraceptives. 23 0 In cases other than Bowers, mo-
rality has been upheld as a legitimate justification for regulating con-
224. The purpose of these illustrations is not to advocate for immoral behavior, but to
demonstrate the arbitrary application of the law as applied to homosexuals.
225. 'Mhe law.., is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws represent-
ing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause,
the courts will be very busy indeed." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196
(1986). But cf TamE, supra note 29, at 1428 ("Because Georgia's sodomy law
slices deeply into the sanctity of the home and the autonomy of private sexual
choices, it cannot be defended ... by 'the mere assertion that the action of the
state finds justification in the controversial realm of morals." (quoting Poe v. Ull-
man, 367 U.S. 497, 545 (1961)(Harlan J., dissenting)).
226. "Georgia would be required to show an actual connection between the forbidden
acts and the ill effects it seeks to prevent." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
209-10 n.3 (1986)(Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Welch, supra note 168 (con-
cluding that Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991), was the first case to
usher in "constitutional populism," allowing the majoritarian morality to dictate
a rational basis for laws without a showing of harm from the proscribed
behavior).
227. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
228. Id. at 448.
229. 431 U.S. 678, 696 (1977).
230. Id. at 695.
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duct without proving secondary effects because all members of the
community shared the moral burden equally.
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 2 3 1 the Supreme Court upheld a
state ban on public nudity as it applied to barroom dancing. The regu-
lation required dancers to wear pasties and a G-string. The plurality
opinion accepted the premise that nude dancing was sufficiently ex-
pressive to receive some minimal First Amendment protection, yet up-
held the regulation because the statute was not aimed at expression,
and the rights of the dancers were only incidentally burdened. 23 2
In a concurring opinion in Barnes, Justice Scalia concluded that
morality provided a sufficient rational basis to uphold a neutral
law.2 33 The law was neutral because the state's interest in preventing
public nudity was neutral. Scalia suggested he might find more rea-
son to suspect the regulation or to require a higher burden ofjustifica-
tion if the regulation burdened one group engaging in nudity, while
turning a blind eye to nude beaches or other instances of nudity.234 In
pitching the argument, Justice Scalia reiterates the "constitution pop-
ulism" argument: absent a constitutional prohibition, morality alone
serves as a rational basis for the law.2 35 But surely that can be true
only in the case of a "general" law, when the burden is shared equally
by all citizens. The element of government neutrality is a require-
ment of all government-made law.2 36
B. Without Religion
The arbitrary use of morality to deny gays and lesbians equal
rights is further illustrated by analyzing how religion is used to justify
bans on gay marriage. Even if a majority of religious groups condemn
such behavior, the state still cannot justify imposing religious judg-
ments on the entire citizenry.2 37 Central to understanding this argu-
ment is the concession that not all homosexuals are "without religion"
and not all religious groups condemn homosexuality.2 38 Reliance on
231. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
232. Id. at 566-67.
233. Id. at 575, 580 (Scalia, J., concurring).
234. Id. at 573-74.
235. Id. at 575.
236. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996). See also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 416 (1992)(Stevens, J., concurring); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S.
385, 391-95 (1969).
237. Opponents of same-sex marriage have never clarified the line between morality
and religion, yet most opponents have used religious moral arguments to justify
their positions.
238. See, e.g., SUZANNE SHERMAN, LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE: PRIVATE CoMMirr-
MENTS, PUBLIC CEREMONIES 4-7 (Suzanne Sherman ed., 1992)(noting that same-
sex marriages are allowed, among others, in Reformed Jewish, Unitarian Univer-
salist, Episcopalian, Lutheran, Presbyterian, and Methodist congregations).
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religious-based morality as a justification for bans on same-gender
marriages assumes that no competing religious interests are at stake.
The erroneous assumption is that homosexuals must necessarily be
nonreligious. In fact, more than 300 congregations of the Metropoli-
tan Community Church have formed specifically to serve the religious
needs of the gay and lesbian community,2 39 and other congregations
welcome gay and lesbian members. 240
Homosexuals lobby just as vigorously to encourage churches to
honor same-sex unions as they lobby to gain legal recognition pre-
cisely because marriage also has spiritual significance to many same-
gender couples. Gays and lesbians are not without their own religions
and religious beliefs simply because their beliefs do not espouse homo-
sexuality as a sin. To the extent gays and lesbians are denied funda-
mental rights based on others' religious beliefs, they become victims of
religious persecution.2 4 '
C. Criminal
Cases since Loving v. Virginia confirm that the right to marry is of
fundamental importance for all individuals.242 Even accepting the ar-
gument that gays and lesbians suffer discrimination not for who they
are, but for what they do, precedent involving marriage interests illus-
trate that homosexual conduct receives significantly different treat-
ment than the conduct of other citizens. Further, this precedent has
rejected the idea that consent requirements can be imposed arbitrarily
on an individual's right to marry.
In Zablocki v. Redhail243 the Supreme Court struck down as un-
constitutional a Wisconsin statute that prohibited citizens who de-
faulted on court-ordered child support from marrying without state
consent. The Court reiterated that the "right to marry is of fundamen-
tal importance for all individuals,"244 even those who had proven
themselves not up to the task. When a classification significantly in-
terferes with an individual's access to marriage, critical examination
239. The Universal Fellowship of Metropolitan Community Churches, Bylaws and
Mission Statement (July 1993)(on file with the Nebraska Law Review).
240. See SHEmiAN, supra note 238.
241. "A government can not be premised on the belief that all persons are created
equal when it asserts that God prefers some." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
606-07 (1992)(Blackmun, J., concurring).
242. The Supreme Court has been careful "to avoid declaring that marriage is a funda-
mental right and has preferred to speak of 'fundamental interests' and 'basic
rights,' suggesting that perhaps something less than the strictest level of judicial
scrutiny may apply when laws infringe upon the marital interest." Wardle, supra
note 74, at 29 n.111. For the purposes of this Comment, however, this distinction
has only incidental relevance.
243. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
244. Id. at 384.
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of the state's interests is required. 245 The Zablocki Court held that
there was no clear connection between the state's asserted interest in
the welfare of children and the means chosen to effectuate that inter-
est of restricting the right to enter marriage.24 6
Likewise, in Turner v. Safley,2 47 the Supreme Court upheld a facial
challenge to a regulation that restricted a state prison inmate's right
to marry. The regulation permitted an inmate to marry only with the
prison superintendent's consent, which could be given only when justi-
fied by "compelling reasons." While the Court agreed that a prisoner's
right to marry is subject to substantial restrictions as a result of incar-
ceration, it also held that important attributes of marriage remain,
even taking into account the limitations imposed by prison life, to
form a constitutionally protected relationship interest.2 48 The Court
characterized those attributes of marriage as the expression of emo-
tional support and public commitment; the expression of personal ded-
ication; a precondition to the receipt of government benefits, property
rights, and other less tangible benefits; and the eventual consumma-
tion of the marriage. 24 9
The Court used a "reasonableness test," and struck down the
prison regulation as unconstitutional. A reasonable regulation re-
quires a "valid, rational connection" between the regulation and a le-
gitimate and neutral governmental interest forwarded to justify its
interest.25 0 The regulation will not be sustained when the logical con-
nection between the regulation and the asserted goals is so remote as
to render the policy arbitrary or irrational, or when the government's
objective is illegitimate. 25 1 Applying this test, the Turner Court found
an "exaggerated," and thus facially invalid connection between the
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
248. Id. at 95-96.
249. Id. With regard to the last interest, it can be assumed the court is referring to
individuals' interest in the sexual intimacy of their marriage relationship. It is
argued that homosexuals are incapable of consummating their marriages. Yet,
consummation of marriages generally has been regarded as a legal justification
for getting out of the marriage, not a legal requirement for entering into the mar-
riage. See Keane, supra note 9, at 526 & n.183. The Supreme Court has stated
that all marriages are presumed valid without mention of its consummation.
Sondrea Joy King, Ya'll Cain't Do That Here: Will Texas Recognize Same-Sex
Marriages Validly Contracted in Other States?, 2 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 515, 541
n.193 (1996)(citing Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1934)). It could be
argued that same-sex marriages are not legally permissible because homosexuals
would have to violate state antisodomy laws to consummate their marriages.
Yet, this would not be true in states that have abandoned their criminal sodomy
laws.
250. Id. at 89-90.
251. Id.
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prison's interest in security and the restriction on marriage.25 2 The
Court noted that "[tihese incidents of marriage ... are unaffected by
the fact of criminal confinement or the pursuit of legitimate corrections
goals."2 53 The Court reasoned that an individual's relationship inter-
ests in marriage are significant enough that not even a compelling
state interest in criminal conduct could completely override the crimi-
nal's fundamental interest in marriage.25 4 "Our task... is to formu-
late a standard of review for prisoners' constitutional claims that is
responsive both to the 'policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner
complaints and [to] the need to protect constitutional rights."255
Zablocki and Turner illustrate yet another anomaly that results
from the unequal treatment of homosexual's marriage rights. Turner
concluded that relationship interests in marriage are not significantly
altered by conduct or status, even when the conduct itself is criminal
or unprotected, and even when the need to confine individuals based
on their criminal conduct has been sufficiently justified based on
threats to the general welfare. Further, Turner recognizes that in all
cases, the individual's interests in marriage must be balanced against
the government's interests in restricting an individual's right to
marry. No presumption of constitutionality exists when government
restrictions significantly interfere with the individual's ability to enter
into marriage. By analogy, then, restrictions against same-gender
marriages must balance gay and lesbian marital interests against the
necessity of the important government interest advanced by prohibi-
tions against same-gender marriages.
While the logic in Turner seems to require application of the above
analysis to same-sex marriages, lower courts have sidestepped equal
protection challenges to prohibitions on same-gender marriages by re-
lying instead on substantive due process arguments 25 6 Like the Bow-
ers Court, lower courts hold that homosexual behavior is not so rooted
in history and tradition to qualify for constitutional protection. 2 57
252. Id. at 90-91.
253. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987)(emphasis added).
254. Id. at 95-96.
255. Id. at 96, 85 (emphasis added)(quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 406
(1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989)). Only one time
has the Supreme Court upheld a prohibition against marriage in the case of pris-
oners. Butler v. Wilson, 415 U.S. 953 (1974). In Butler v. Wilson, the state pro-
hibited inmates serving a life sentence from marrying. In such situations, the
Court held that the State justified its interest as part of the punishment for crime
involving a life sentence because the asserted penological objective was suffi-
ciently important to justify the deprivation of the right to marry.
256. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185-86 (Minn. 1971)(arguing that the
traditional definition of marriage as between one women and one man is control-
ling), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). But cf JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-Sx
UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE (1994); Eskridge, supra note 45.
257. See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 331 (D.C. 1995).
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Constitutional scholars and several courts have suggested these con-
clusions result from a misunderstanding of the principal differences
between due process and equal protection. 2 58 The Due Process Clause
is tradition-protecting, while the Equal Protection Clause is tradition-
correcting. The Due Process Clause is meant to safeguard rights,
while the Equal Protection Clause assures that those rights are ap-
plied equally, or if not applied equally, that sufficient justification sup-
ports the distinction.259
Even courts refusing to extend the right to marry to homosexuals
based on a due process analysis have suggested the marriage interest
is not constitutionally immune from evenhanded regulation. 260 While
the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent the government from
enacting laws based on substantive value choices, it does require even-
handed application of these values. 2 61
The Equal Protection Clause, by contrast [to the Due Process Clause], protects
minorities from discriminatory treatment at the hands of the majority. Its
purpose is not to protect traditional values and practices, but to call into ques-
tion such values and practices when they operate to burden disadvantaged
minorities....
... It is perfectly consistent to say that homosexual sodomy is not a prac-
tice so deeply rooted in our traditions as to merit due process protection, and
at the same time to say, for example, that because homosexuals have histori-
cally been subject to invidious discrimination, laws which burden homosexu-
als as a class should be subjected to heightened scrutiny under the equal
protection clause. Indeed, the two propositions may be complimentary. In all
probability, homosexuality is not considered a deeply-rooted part of our tradi-
tions precisely because homosexuals have historically been subjected to invidi-
ous discrimination. In any case, homosexuals do not become "fair game" for
discrimination simply because their sexual practices are not considered part
of our mainstream traditions. 2 6 2
To the extent conduct or status justifies barring same-gender couples
from marriage, such justification violates the Equal Protection Clause
because conduct and status are used against homosexuals to deny
258. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 718-19 (9th Cir.
1989)(Norris, J., concurring); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Con-
stitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection,
55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1161, 1174-76 (1988).
259. Sunstein, supra note 258, at 1174-76.
260. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). See also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 403-04 (1978)("A classification based on marital status is fundamentally dif-
ferent from a classification which determines who may lawfully enter into the
marriage relationship. The individual's interest in making the marriage decision
independently is sufficiently important to merit special constitutional protec-
tion."). Regulations restricting the right to enter into marriage must be
evenhanded.
261. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 720 (9th Cir. 1989)(Norris, J.,
concurring).
262. Id. at 718-19.
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them marriage rights in a way the justifications are not and cannot be
used against heterosexuals. 2 63
D. Threat
Mhe deliberative conception of democracy... restricts the reasons citizens
may use in supporting legislation to reasons consistent with the recognition of
other citizens as equals. Here lies the difficulty with arguments for laws sup-
porting discrimination.... The point is that no institutional procedure with-
out such substantive guidelines for admissible reasons can cancel the maxim
"garbage in, garbage out."264
At least one state now has recognized that prohibitions on same-
gender marriages may violate equal protection guarantees. In 1993,
the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin held that under its state
constitution the state's marriage statute contained an impermissible
sex classification.2 65 The Hawaii Constitution contains an equal
rights amendment that prohibits the denial of civil rights on the basis
of sex.2 66 The court did not recognize a fundamental right to enter
into homosexual marriages. Instead, it recognized that the right to
marry is a basic civil right. Since Hawaii's marriage statute regulates
rights and benefits on the basis of the applicants' gender, the statute
involved both a civil right and a sex-based classification.267
The Baehr court soundly rejected the State's definitional argument
to uphold the gender classification in marriage laws for several rea-
sons.26 8 First, marriage is a state conferred legal status and a state
defined classification. 269 This implicates the equal protection chal-
lenge because the Hawaii Constitution makes all gender classifica-
263. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)(holding that status, as opposed to
conduct, cannot be made a crime).
264. Sunstein, supra note 133, at 59 (quoting JoHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 430-
31 (2d ed. 1996)).
265. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
266. The Hawaii Constitution provides that
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due pro-
cess of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied
the enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in
the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or ancestry.
HAw. CoNsT. art. I, § 5 (1978).
267. Gender discrimination exists because a lesbian is told that she may not marry the
person of her choice since she is not a man. Likewise, a man is told he cannot
marry the person of his choice because he is not a woman. Because of sex, people
are prohibited from doing something that they could do if of a different sex.
268. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993)('The facts in Loving and the respec-
tive reasoning of the Virginia courts, on the one hand, and the United States
Supreme Court, on the other, both discredit the [definitional argument] and un-
mask the tautological and circular nature of [the state's] argument .... ." (cita-
tions omitted)).
269. Id. at 58.
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tions expressly suspect.2 70 Second, denying access to obtain marriage
status and denying the corresponding rights and benefits causes a sig-
nificant harm.2 7 1 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, homosex-
ual status is irrelevant to the equal protection challenge; 27 2 same-
gender couples are prohibited from marrying simply based on their
gender. Because the statute involves gender classifications, the gov-
ernment must demonstrate a compelling reason to justify the distinc-
tion or the statute must fall.273
The dissent disagreed that the state marriage statute involved a
gender classification. The dissent fell in line with the definitional
view of marriage as one man and one woman and distinguished Lov-
ing. The issue involved in Loving fit the marriage "definition."2 74
Therefore, the dissent reasoned that the definition of marriage treats
everyone alike and applies equally to both sexes.27 5 This is the "sepa-
rate but equal" argument that appears to justify regulations on terms
270. Id. at 60. Racial classifications in marriage statutes required two whites or two
blacks. Gender classifications prohibit two men or two women from marrying. In
each instance the applicant can be prohibited from entering marriage because
they are not the correct race or gender. In each instance, those applicants are
disadvantaged, burdened, or harmed.
271. Id. at 59.
272. Id. at 54 n.14.
273. The Court determined that "strict scrutiny" was the proper test for a suspect clas-
sification based on gender under the Hawaii Constitution. In Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973), the Supreme Court agreed that "classifications
based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, and national ori-
gin, are inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scru-
tiny." The plurality opinion in Frontiero used both strict and intermediate
scrutiny. The "Powell group" reasoned that intermediate scrutiny was sufficient
to strike down the law and concluded that since strict scrutiny was unnecessary
to the Court's conclusion, declaring strict scrutiny to be the proper standard for
gender classifications should be avoided. This reasoning was applied in light of
pending state ratification (which failed) of the Equal Rights Amendment, so there
was sufficient reason to let the legislative process proceed.
The Hawaii Supreme Court thus concluded that
[t]he Powell group's concurring opinion... permits but one inference:
had the Equal Rights Amendment been incorporated into the United
States Constitution, at least seven members (and probably eight) of the
Frontiero Court would have subjected statutory sex-based classifications
to "strict" judicial scrutiny.
In light of the interrelationship between the reasoning of the Bren-
nan plurality and the Powell group in Frontiero ... and... the Equal
Rights Amendment-in the Hawaii Constitution ... we hold that sex is
... subject to the "strict scrutiny" test. It therefore follows, and we so
hold, that (1) [Hawaii's marriage statute] is presumed to be unconstitu-
tional (2) unless ... the State of Hawaii, can show that (a) the statute's
sex-based classification is justified by compelling state interests and (b)
the statute is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of the
applicant couples' constitutional rights.
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993).
274. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d. 44, 70 (Haw. 1993)(Heen, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 71 (Heen, J., dissenting).
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of superficial equality. 2 76 But, the Loving Court specifically rejected
this argument. It was not the definition of marriage that failed in
Loving. Rather, the definition was an insufficient government interest
to support the burden of a constitutional right: the traditional defini-
tion of marriage that was in vogue at that time was an insufficient
justification for the burden placed on an individual's decision to enter
marriage.27 7
The dissent in Baehr, like the proponents of bans on same-gender
marriages, argued that the court's equal protection holding consti-
tutes illegitimate judicial activism. 2 78 The majority responded by reit-
erating basic equal protection principles. 27 9 Laws that classify
citizens for unique burdens or benefits must be justified or they violate
the Equal Protection Clause. When the classification involves a fun-
damental right2so or a suspect class, 28 1 the government's burden of
justification is heightened. The majority recognized that the principle
of equal protection limits legislative power. While "the legislature, in
enacting [the state marriage statute], obviously contemplated mar-
riages between persons of the opposite sex," legislative intent is not
dispositive of the equal protection claim.28 2 The majority relied on
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,283 in which the
Supreme Court stated that even under a rational basis review, the
government cannot "avoid the strictures of [the Equal Protection]
Clause by deferring to the wishes or objections of some fraction of the
body politic." 2 8 4 "It is plain that the electorate as a whole,... could
not order ... action violative of the Equal Protection Clause."'28 5
276. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896)(stating that if the separate but
equal doctrine violated the equal protection clause, "it is not by reason of any-
thing found in the [statute], but solely because the colored race chooses to put
that construction upon it").
277. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
278. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 5 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,
2909.
279. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67-68 (Haw. 1993).
280. Id. at 67 (stating that "marriage is a basic civil right").
281. That marriage is a basic civil right "is relevant to the prohibition set forth in
article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution against discrimination in the exer-
cise of a person's civil rights, inter alia, on the basis of sex." Id.
282. Id. at 60 n.20.
283. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
284. Id. at 448.
285. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60 n.20 (Haw. 1993)(quoting City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985)). Incredibly, the House Re-
port on DOMA characterized the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision as an errone-
ous interpretation of "their" Constitution. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 6 (1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.AN. 2905, 2910.
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V. DECLARATION OF WAR
By taking the Full Faith and Credit Clause out of the legal equation ... Con-
gress will ... protect the ability of the elected officials in each State to deliber-
ate on this important policy issue free from the threat of constitutional
compulsion.2
8 6
In Romer v. Evans, Justice Scalia characterized the debate over
gay rights as a "culture war."2 87 Likewise, the battle for and against
same-gender marriages can be viewed as a war mentality. The impli-
cations of the Baehr decision pose a serious threat to opponents of
same-gender marriages. Members of Congress reacted to combat this
threat and passed the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 (DOMA).
DOMA has two provisions, each raising its own set of constitu-
tional issues. The first provides that "[n]o State ... shall be required
to give effect" to same-gender "marriage" licenses issued by another
State.28 8 The second provision defines marriage for all purposes of
federal law as "only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife."28 9 These provisions have two effects. First, states
are granted an exemption from the Full Faith and Credit Clause so
that no state would be required to recognize same-sex marriages that
are legal in other states. Second, all federal benefits associated with
same-gender marriage and family are denied even if a state has legal-
ized these marriages.
When the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in Baehr v. Lewin290
made same-gender marriages a likely probability in Hawaii, oppo-
nents of these marriages feared that if Hawaii validated same-sex
marriage, other states also would have to recognize the validity of
such unions. While courts perhaps could find public policy exceptions
to invalidate certain marriages, a significant number of states either
have enacted validation statutes or have adopted the Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act (Uniform Act), which presume the validity of
marriages performed in other states. 29 1 The Uniform Act expressly
286. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 17, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2921 (empha-
sis added).
287. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1637 (1996)(Scalia, J., dissenting)(holding un-
constitutional Colorado's Constitutional Amendment Two, which prohibited any
governmental action that would protect any person based on their "homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct practices or relationships").
288. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1997).
289. 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West Supp. 1997).
290. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
291. See Note, supra note 11, at 2051 n.71. See also Keane, supra note 9, at 515 n.103.
The following states have adopted the Uniform Act's validation section: Arizona,
Colorado, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and Washington. The follow-
ing states have enacted their own validation statutes: Arkansas, California,
Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico, South Dakota,
Utah, and Wyoming.
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fails to incorporate a public policy exception for states in favor of sta-
bility and predictability.2 92
Many commentators have challenged the constitutionality of
DOMA,293 including several constitutional scholars who testified
before Congress during the DOMA debates. 2 9 4 Congressional power
to enact the first provision in DOMA, which creates a categorical ex-
ception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause in regard to same-gender
marriages, has been emphatically challenged.2 95 As a matter of "first
principles," Congress is confined to exercise those powers expressly
delegated to it by the Constitution. 296 Those powers not expressly del-
egated are reserved to the states via the Tenth Amendment.2 9 7
The House Report accompanying DOMA argues that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause itself empowers Congress to enact DOMA.298 The
second provision of the Full Faith and Credit Clause states that "Con-
gress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."29 9
Congressional proponents of DOMA argue that the Clause should be
read to mean that Congress shall be able to prescribe the effects of
another state's acts.30 0 According to the House Report, this "narrow,
targeted relaxation" of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is constitu-
tional.301 Thus, if DOMA is unnecessary because states may rely on
public policy exceptions to evade same-gender marriages, it cannot be
unconstitutional for Congress to clarify that states have such author-
ity.302 Proponents of DOMA suggest it is far "preferable" to "set forth
292. See Note, supra note 11, at 2051 ("By rejecting the 'strong public policy' excep-
tion, the UMDA assumes that, except in the case of specifically prohibited mar-
riages, states should ensure stability and predictability in familial relations by
validating legal foreign marriages, whether or not the state's own law would per-
mit the celebration of such a marriage locally.").
293. "[DOMA] is woefully ill-advised and is morally wrong." 142 CONG. REC. S10076
(daily ed. Sept. 9, 1996)[hereinafter Testimony 1](statement of Rabbi Saperstein,
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center). See also id. at S10079 [hereinaf-
ter Testimony 1](statement of Herma Hill Kay, Dean, University of California
School of Law).
294. Testimony I, supra note 4, at S5932 (statement of Prof. Tribe); Hearings, supra
note 4 (statement of Prof. Sunstein).
295. See Testimony I, supra note 4, at S5932 (statement of Prof. Tribe); Hearings,
supra note 4 (statement of Prof. Sunstein); Paige Chabora, Congress' Power
Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996,
76 NEB. L. REV. 603 (1997).
296. Testimony I, supra note 4, at S5932 (statement of Prof. Tribe)(quoting New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-56 (1992)).
297. Id. at S5932 (statement of Prof. Tribe)(quoting United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
1624, 1626 (1995); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
298. H.R. REP. No. 104-664 passim, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 2905 passim.
299. U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 1.
300. H.R. RaP. No. 104-664 passim, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.N. 2905 passim.
301. Id. at 28, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C-.AN. 2905, 2932.
302. Id.
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specific statutory guidelines to direct the courts" as to what the law
should be in this complicated area, "rather than to leave it to the un-
certain and inefficient prospect of litigation.3o3
Such reasoning is faulty for two reasons. First, Congress has no
power to alter or "relax" the Constitution even if Congress could
achieve the same result through constitutional means. Second, public
policy exceptions under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, as well as
under the conflict of laws doctrine, require judicial proceedings to de-
termine the applicable law and rights of the parties. Congress is pow-
erless to circumvent the judicial process, even if Congress ultimately
would achieve the same results as a judicial proceeding. Denying par-
ties access to courts to adjudicate constitutional rights most likely vio-
lates previous Supreme Court precedent.30 4
Congress also has made it more difficult for gays and lesbians to
enact same-gender marriage legislation at the state level. Ironically,
Congress has interfered with the democratic process and significantly
diluted the credibility of the argument that gays and lesbians, needing
no political protection, do not merit suspect status.3 0 5 Regardless of
whether states allow people of the same sex to marry, whether the
decision is made by the state supreme court, by referendum, by a state
legislature, or by a combination thereof, the "only real force [DOMAI
will have will be to deny a state and the people of that state the right
to make decisions on the question of same-sex marriage."30 6 In un-
neutral terms, Congress has disadvantaged gays and lesbians by con-
structing obstacles in their political path.
The Supreme Court's holdings in both Romer v. Evans307 and
Hunter v. Erickson308 suggest that DOMA may violate the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment by imposing a unique burden on
gays and lesbians alone.3 0 9 By passing DOMA, Congress gave states
303. Id.
304. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996)("A law declaring that in general
it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid
from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most
literal sense.").
305. See, e.g., id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(characterizing gays and lesbians as a
"politically powerful minority"). But see Amar, supra note 129, at 232-33 ("Jus-
tice Scalia suggests that the inequality imposed-forcing gays and his to win
their rights statewide while heteros can win locally-is a justified reaction to
queers' special clout as a 'politically powerful minority.' They are organized; they
'reside in disproportionate numbers in certain communities'; they 'have high dis-
posable income'; they 'possess political power much greater than their numbers.'
But much the same could be said-and in some times and places has been said-
of Jews. Surely Justice Scalia would not allow Colorado to handicap Jews in
elections.").
306. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 42 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2945.
307. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
308. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
309. See Hearings, supra note 4 (testimony of Prof. Sunstein).
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a vested interest in not granting marital status to same-gender
couples because of states' interest in having their laws recognized in
other jurisdictions 31 0 and by making it impossible for states to admin-
ister their marriage laws evenhandedly. These two effects of DOMA
might influence a state in deciding whether to permit same-gender
marriage in the first place.3 1 '
Most notably, the questionable constitutionality of DOMA did not
delay Congress in its zeal to combat the threat of same-gender mar-
riages. Confident that its intentions would be well-received by a ma-
jority of the public, Congress defended its actions as necessary to
protect the states from having same-gender marriages foisted on them
by "judicial fiat."312 While acknowledging that Congress has no say in
how the Hawaii Supreme Court interprets its state constitution, the
House Report purports to reveal that the citizens of Hawaii do not
want marriage licenses issued to couples of the same-gender and this
provides a sufficient reason to enact federal legislation to prevent "ju-
dicial activism" from legalizing same-gender marriages. 3 13 In so argu-
ing, Congress made a calculated and potentially risky decision that
sufficient hostility toward same-gender marriages would support Con-
gress' "power grab."3 14
If Congress has guessed wrong, some very unpleasant conse-
quences may result. If even one or two states adopt same-gender mar-
riages, DOMA could backfire, resulting in a "legal quagmire."3 15 Can
the federal government recognize heterosexual marriages only when
valid same-gender marriages exist without violating due process?
How will DOMA impede a citizen's right to travel?3 16 Will DOMA
make a state's evenhanded administration of their family law
impossible?
Ironically, the constitutional issues surrounding DOMA and rela-
tively disregarded by Congress raise questions concerning Congress'
310. See Baehr v. Mlke, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *19-20 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec.
3, 1996). The State asserted that DOMA pronounced a compelling interest in
securing and assuring the recognition of Hawaii marriages in other jurisdictions
that supported the ban on same-gender marriages. The court agreed it was an
important issue, but found no additional evidence to support the State's argu-
ment. Id.
311. See Testimony III, supra note 293, at S10079 (statement of Dean Kay).
312. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 7 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.AN. 2905, 2911.
313. Id. at 6, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.N. 2905, 2910.
314. Testimony I, supra note 4, at S5932 (statement of Prof. Tribe)(calling the congres-
sional action a "power grab").
315. Testimony II, supra note 293, at S10078 (statement of Rabbi Saper-
stein)("Whatever the result of this ... legislation, a legal quagmire awaits us.").
316. Even if Congress invoked the Commerce Clause as authority to enact DOMA, the
Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), that Con-
gress had exceeded its scope of authority in enacting the Gun Free School Zone
Act, also would suggest DOMA is unconstitutional.
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ability to act constitutionally in light of the political realities of con-
temporary lawmaking. Ironically again, it is precisely this type of
abuse of power that mandates judicial review.3 17 Congress rejected
the credibility of another branch of government and then asserted
that this power grab was necessary but limited--"intruding only to
the extent necessary to forestall the impending legal assault. 3 18
Then it fastidiously asserted that DOMA will have no effect whatso-
ever on the manner in which any individual state, including Hawaii,
may prescribe its own marriage laws.3 19 Despite its bald assertions,
Congress has made it more difficult for states to administer their mar-
riage laws. Congress has made it clear that unless "states happen to
share Congress' view"3 20 regarding their own marriage laws, the state
is on its own.
VI. LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT PURPOSE?
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional. 32 1
DOMA is unconstitutional for yet another reason-it fails to ad-
vance the asserted governmental interests, and the interests DOMA
does advance fail to serve legitimate governmental purposes. While
legal commentators disagree about the role of ends-analysis in ra-
tional basis tests,32 2 any heightened scrutiny requires that the statu-
tory means be related to some legitimate government purpose.3 23 The
Supreme Court's previous precedent relating to marriage, 32 4 and the
Court's holding in Romer v. Evans32 5 suggest heightened scrutiny
317. Tiia FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)(describ-
ing the roles of the three branches of government).
318. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 29 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2933.
319. Id. at 25, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2929.
320. Tribe, supra note 1, at Ell.
321. M'Culloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)(emphasis added).
322. But cf. Welch, supra note 168, at 86 ( [E]very means is perfectly related to some
purpose. Only when certain purposes are found to be impermissible does the
means-testing prong of the rational basis requirement have any significance.
Thus a means-focused model designed to avoid value judgments about the legiti-
macy of legislative purposes ... only obscures the process that must take place.
Even under the deferential rationality standard, courts simply cannot review leg-
islation without making difficult substantive choices.").
323. Generally, this has been true of the Court's jurisprudence even under a rational
basis analysis. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)(quoting F.S. Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,415 (1920)). See also Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974)(quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
324. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
325. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
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should be applied to statutory bans on same-gender marriages: 3 26
when the means employed by a statute do not relate to the statute's
ends, the statutory purpose is illegitimate.32 7
DOMA's prime objective is to defend heterosexual marriage.3 28 As
the discussion earlier illustrated, marriage is a fundamental interest
for all citizens, regardless of their sexual orientation. 3 29 To restrict a
gay or lesbian citizen's interest in marriage, the restriction must ad-
vance at least some important governmental interest.33 0 The stan-
dards under Zablocki v. Redhail331 and Turner v. Safley332 reject the
idea that a separate substantive due process test must be performed
before homosexual individuals have the same right to marry as other
citizens. 3 33
It is not the interests of certain citizens that determine whether a
right is fundamental for other citizens.3 34 If a convicted felon has a
326. Strong arguments also can be made that bans on same-sex marriage constitute
gender discrimination, which also would require heightened scrutiny. See Baehr
v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (1993)(citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
327. Welch, supra note 168, at 85 (citing Robert W. Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in
Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CAL. L. REV.
1049, 1078 (1979)).
328. H.R. REP. No. 104-664 passim (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905
passim.
329. Rights belong to individuals, not groups. See Karst, supra note 79, at 327. See
also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). Same-gender marriages are
not announcing a new right.
330. It is unnecessary for the purposes of this Comment to determine whether the
exact nature of the heightened scrutiny should be a rational basis "with a bite" or
an intermediate review. The purpose of this section is to examine the relation-
ship between restrictions placed on same-gender marriages and the interests ad-
vanced by those restrictions.
331. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
332. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
333. Justifications for announcing a new right by legalizing same-gender marriages
often rest less on the logic or validity of the argument, and more on the "slippery
slope" theory. If the right to marry is a fundamental interest for all citizens, then
the door opens to other challenges on restrictions to the right to marry. See Wil-
liam Raspberry, The "What Next" Dilemma, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1996, at A23
("The insistence upon eternal certainties regarding matters of which we know
very little can make some people cling to positions well beyond their logical
defensibility.").
334. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987). In Turner, the Supreme
Court specifically rejected the following argument when prison officials argued
that different marriage rights should apply to prisoners.
We disagree ... that Zablocki does not apply to prison inmates. It is
settled that a prison inmate "retains those [constitutional] rights that
are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system." The right to marry,
like many other rights, is subject to substantial restrictions as a result of
incarceration. Many important attributes of marriage remain, however,
after taking into account the limitations imposed by prison life.
Id. (alteration in original)(citations omitted).
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constitutionally protected interest in the marriage relationship, and a
homosexual citizen is similarly situated in relation to those inter-
ests,33 5 it follows that the citizen's right to marry cannot be restricted
based on homosexual conduct alone. To say a government interest
justifies restricting the right to marry to heterosexual citizens only is
something altogether different from saying homosexual citizens have
no right to marry in the first instance. The former cannot be used to
justify the latter.
In Zablocki, the Court noted that justifying a marriage regulation
that significantly interferes with an individual's interests in marriage
requires a "critical examination" of the state's interests advanced in
support of the classification.3 3 6 The Turner Court permitted substan-
tial restriction on the rights of prisoners, but concluded that to be con-
stitutional, restrictions on an inmate's right to marry must be
reasonably related to a legitimate objective.3 37 In Turner, the Court
found no such relationship and characterized the restriction as an "ex-
aggerated response" to the concerns advanced in support of the
restriction. 338
The Zablocki Court also distinguished between reasonable regula-
tions on marriage and those that significantly interfere with the right
to enter into marriage. Regulations may be imposed legitimately if
they do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the mar-
ital relationship.3 3 9 In striking down a state statute restricting the
right of "dead-beat dads" to marry, the Zablocki Court concluded that
the statute significantly interfered with the right of such fathers to
marry and failed to advance the asserted government interest in safe-
guarding the welfare of children. The statute simply prevented the
applicant from marrying, without assuring the applicant's children
would receive child support. Moreover, other means were available to
accomplish the goal of safeguarding children without impinging on the
right to marry.34 0
Of significant importance for the present discussion was the
Zablocki Court's finding that the marriage regulations were both sig-
nificantly underinclusive and overinclusive.3 4 1 The marriage restric-
tion was underinclusive in that it sought to protect support obligations
only by limitations on marriage rather than other restrictions that sig-
335. See id. at 95-96.
336. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978).
337. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
338. Id. at 91.
339. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
340. In both Zablocki and Turner, the Supreme Court appeared to use the "least re-
strictive means" test. The Court noted, however, this was not the "least restric-
tive means test." Instead, the existence of alternatives may be evidence that the
regulation is not reasonable. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987).
341. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390 (1978).
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nificantly affected the state's interest in that area.3 42 It was overin-
clusive because allowing marriage actually may better serve the
state's asserted interest than would restricting it.343 By preventing
marriage, the net result of the statute was the opposite effect of what
the statute sought to advance.344
Likewise, the Turner Court struck down a restriction on marriage
because the restriction was not reasonably related to any legitimate
prison objective and was both overinclusive and underinclusive.345
Prison officials in Turner identified two justifications for restricting
prisoners' right to marry-concerns over rehabilitation and security.
The evidence suggested that the only rehabilitative purpose served by
the restriction on marriage related to Superintendent Turner's experi-
ence with several ill-advised marriage requests from female in-
mates.3 46 Based on this evidence, the Court concluded that the
restriction was overinclusive. Superintendent Turner testified that
male inmates did not pose the same problems and, generally, neither
did female inmates who married civilians. Thus, the Court held that
the proffered justification failed to explain why a rule restricting mar-
riages for all inmates should be adopted.347 The Court expressed con-
cern that such a "lopsided rehabilitation" objective was the
justification for the broad marriage rule.3 48 "On this record ... the
almost complete ban on the decision to marry is not reasonably related
to legitimate penological objectives. We conclude, therefore, that the
Missouri marriage regulation is facially invalid."349
With regard to the security interest, the Turner Court noted that
"[n]o doubt legitimate security concerns may require placing reason-
able restrictions upon an inmate's right to marry, and may justify re-
quiring approval of the superintendent. 3 5o But the Court held that
no evidence suggested the concerns cited would develop with or with-
out marriage, and therefore the regulation did nothing to protect se-
curity.35 1 Further, available alternatives placed only a de minimis
burden on security while still accommodating the inmates' right to
marry.3 52 Due to its rather attenuated connection to the asserted in-
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
346. Id. at 98-99.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 99.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 97.
351. Id. at 97-99.
352. Id. at 98.
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terests, the Court concluded the regulation could be characterized
only as an exaggerated response to its objectives.353
In the context of same-gender marriage, Turner still would require
a reasonable connection between the restrictions on same-gender mar-
riages and a legitimate and neutral governmental interest (accepting
for the moment that there is one) implicated by homosexual status.
The "regulation cannot be sustained where the logical connection be-
tween the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render
the policy arbitrary or irrational."354 In addition, the Court's analysis
of both the overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of the chal-
lenged restrictions in both cases demonstrates that a reasonable clas-
sification is one that includes all persons who are similarly situated
with respect to the purpose of the law. Arguments used to justify
prohibitions on same-gender marriages also are grossly underinclu-
sive and overinclusive because the proffered justifications apply
equally to heterosexuals.
A. Overinclusive and Underinclusive with Regard to Those
Similarly Situated
Heterosexuals and homosexuals are similarly situated with regard
to the interests served by marriage. Opponents of same-gender mar-
riages argue that the government's interest in children via procreation
and childbearing is the most compelling justification for banning
same-gender marriages. Procreation is perhaps the sole reason the
government supports and prefers heterosexual marriage.355 If it was
not for procreation, the government would have no interest in encour-
aging citizens to form families.356 Opponents then assume that be-
cause homosexuals cannot procreate, they are not similarly situated to
heterosexuals.
Even if such arguments were true at one time, marriage laws are
no longer administered this way with regard to heterosexuals. In
Baehr, the Hawaii court found that reasons for marrying are not lim-
ited to a desire to procreate. 357 Additionally, common sense suggests
that the procreation argument is, at best, an understatement of the
value of marriage to society.358 Supreme Court precedent also asserts
that marriage involves far greater interests.3 59 Marriage has not
353. Id. at 97-98.
354. Id. at 89-90.
355. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 13 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C-.AN. 2905, 2917.
356. Id. at 14, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2918.
357. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *18 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996)(finding of fact
No. 138).
358. See supra Part II.
359. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987)(listing various attributes of
marriage, some of which are available even to prisoners).
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been solely about procreation since the legalization of birth control in
1965, when the Supreme Court acknowledged the right of married
couples to make nonprocreative choices with regard to their marital
interests. 360 Perhaps the most significant reason why this argument
fails is because procreation is used against homosexuals in a way that
it is not used against heterosexuals. To the extent gays and lesbians
are denied marriage rights because they do not plan to procreate, have
chosen not to procreate, or are unable to procreate, the ban violates
the Equal Protection Clause.3 6 ' No justification exists for denying
heterosexual couples the rights of marriage when their marriage in-
terest is unrelated to procreation. The same can be said for homosex-
ual couples.
Homosexual relationships, like heterosexual relationships, involve
decisions relating to procreation and child-rearing. The decision
whether or not to "bear or beget" children has been held to be a funda-
mental right under the Constitution.362 Government no longer can
base the regulation of access to marriage on an individual's desire or
ability to procreate. If failure or inability to procreate cannot affect a
heterosexual's right to marry, then it cannot affect a homosexual citi-
zen's right to marry unless some compelling interest distinguishes
homosexuals from heterosexuals, and only so long as that interest is
achieved by the most narrowly-drawn regulation.3 6 3
The problem with the reasonableness of such a regulation is fur-
ther complicated because gays and lesbians can and do procreate.3 64
Biologically, gays and lesbians have the same procreation capacity as
heterosexuals. Gays and lesbians have children prior to their homo-
sexual couplings, through artificial insemination or by surrogacy.
Heterosexual couples can use the same methods of procreation. Even
if such methods of procreation should be discouraged, millions of het-
erosexual couples procreate via these same means. Basing marriage
rights on the method of procreation chosen would have a significant
effect on heterosexual couples as well. To the extent that no such limi-
360. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
361. It has been estimated that between 10% and 15% of all married couples are un-
able to conceive. Keane, supra note 9, at 518 n.120 (citing Joan Heifetz Hollinger,
From Coitus to Commerce: Legal and Social Consequences of Noncoital Repro-
duction, 18 U. Mxci. J.L. REF. 865, 873 (1985)). Further, it has been estimated
that 4.4% of white wives ages 18-24 expect to have no children. Id. at 518 n.121
(citing Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby
Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 336 (1978)).
362. Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977)(quoting Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973)). 'The decision whether or not to beget or bear
a child is at the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices."
Id. at 685.
363. Id. at 686.
364. See, e.g., Kantrowitz, supra note 47, at 52 ("[S]perm banks say they're in the
midst of what some call a 'gayby boom' propelled by lesbians.").
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tations are placed on heterosexual couples, there is no justification for
treating the marriage rights of homosexual couples differently be-
cause they may choose alternative methods of conception.
B. No Reasonable Relationship to Objective
DOMA simply fails to serve the government's interest in fostering
procreation in the marital setting. In fact, by denying gays and lesbi-
ans access to marriage, DOMA fosters quite the opposite result. Gays
and lesbians are forced to have children outside the marital setting.
This neither defends the institution of marriage nor protects the insti-
tution from devaluation as suggested by DOMA proponents. 36 5 In-
stead, DOMA perpetuates the devaluation of marriage. When citizens
learn to survive and prosper without the benefits and protections of
marriage, they begin to find that marriage lacks value.
Attempts to justify bans on same-gender marriages also ignore the
reality that many gay men and lesbians are not only having children,
but already are raising children3 66 and will continue to raise their
children, with or without access to marriage. DOMA fails to advance
the government's interest in protecting the welfare of children. First,
by failing to recognize the legitimacy of these families, the children of
gays and lesbians are denied legitimacy. Moreover, bans on same-
gender marriages jeopardizes children because children raised by
same-gender couples are denied the protections and benefits that ac-
company marriage.3 6 7 One witness who testified for the State in
Baehr stated that children raised without the protection of marital
status are at greater risk for, inter alia, poverty or economic hard-
ship,3 68 and that these children would be helped if their families had
access to various benefits of marriage.3 69
Bans on same-gender marriages also fail to advance the govern-
ment's interest in child-rearing. The Baehr court specifically found
that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that
gays and lesbians were unfit parents. 37 0 To the contrary, a continu-
ally growing mountain of evidence indicates that homosexuals are as
capable as heterosexual couples of raising happy, healthy, and well-
365. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 14-15 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,
2918-19.
366. It has been estimated that 6 to 14 million children are raised by homosexual
parents in at least 4 million households. See, e.g., Keane, supra note 9, at 519
n.124 (citing Daniel Goleman, Studies Find No Disadvantage in Growing Up in a
Gay Home, N.Y. Tim s, Dec. 2, 1992, at C14).
367. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *18 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996)(finding of fact no. 136).
368. Id. at *7 (finding of fact no. 46).
369. Id. at *8 (finding of fact no. 55).
370. Id. at *17-18 (findings of fact nos. 126-35, 139).
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adjusted children.371 The state's evidence in Baehr presented perhaps
the strongest evidence suggesting that gays and lesbians are fit par-
ents.3 72 On remand, the State attempted to justify bans on same-gen-
der marriage by asserting a compelling interest to promote the
optimal development of children and that bans on same-gender mar-
riage advanced that interest. Following the testimony of eight wit-
nesses,3 73 the court found that the State failed to prove a causal link
between same-sex marriage and its adverse effects upon the optimal
development of children, or that the public interest in the well-being of
children and families would be adversely affected by same-gender
marriage.3 74 The court noted that one of the state's witnesses agreed
that gay and lesbian parents "are doing a good job" raising children
and, most importantly, "the kids are turning out just fine."375
The Hawaii court's findings of fact support the arguments made in
Part II of this Comment relating to the functions that the family
serves. The court found that there is diversity in the structure and
configuration of families in Hawaii and elsewhere.3 76 The evidence
established that the single most important factor in the development
of a happy, healthy, and well-adjusted child is the nurturing relation-
371. Id. at *21 (conclusion of law no. 18)(concluding as a matter of law that insufficient
credible evidence supported the position that the public interest in the well-being
of children and families would be adversely affected by same-sex marriages be-
cause all three witnesses for the State testified that gay parents can be as effec-
tive in raising children as heterosexual parents); G. Dorsey Green & Frederick W.
Bozett, Lesbian Mothers and Gay Fathers, in HoMosExUALTY, REsEARcH IMPLI-
CATIONS FOR PUBLIC PoLICY 197, 198 (John C. Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich
eds., 1991); Cynthia L. Greene & Donald K. Butler, Gay Parents Ruled Fit, NAT'L
L.J., May 1, 1995, at Al, B9; Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation:
A Lawyer's Guide to Social Science Research, 1 LAw & SExUALITY 133, 157 (1991);
Homosexual Parents: All in the Family, 147 Sci. NEws 42, 42 (1995); Shapiro &
Gregory, supra note 47, at 76, 79 (reporting that the American Psychological As-
sociation now reports that more than forty studies indicate children of gay par-
ents are likely to be as well-adjusted as the prodigy of traditional unions; society's
reaction has the biggest impact on these children; there is a slightly higher inci-
dence of homosexuality among these children, but researchers are unsure if it
relates to heredity or to the possibility that these children likely view homosexu-
ality differently; and no evidence indicates parenting style is responsible).
The research on lesbian and gay parents does have serious limitations, how-
ever, in that most studies are nonrandom, with subjects who are Caucasian, well-
educated, from urban areas, and who are relatively accepting of their homosexu-
ality. Green & Bozett, supra, at 199.
372. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *1 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
373. Four witnesses testified for the State and four witnesses testified for the plain-
tiffs. While the plaintiffs had no burden of proof in the case, they elected to pres-
ent testimony.
374. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *18 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996)(finding of fact no. 139).
375. Id. (finding of fact no. 135).
376. Id. at *17 (finding of fact no. 123).
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ship between parent and child.377 More specifically, the quality of
parenting is the most significant factor affecting child development.3 78
The sexual orientation of a parent is not, in itself, an indicator of pa-
rental fitness.
C. No Legitimate Purpose
[T]o presume that morality follows heterosexual marriage ignores centuries of
evidence that each is possible without the other.37 9
The sole justification remaining for targeting same-gender couples
for ineligibility with regard to the generally available privileges of
marriage is to promote and preserve morality. Allowing same-gender
couples to marry would legitimize homosexuality and threaten the
government's ability to stamp homosexual behavior as illegitimate.
This justification, however, fails to support the principles advanced by
DOMA. The ability to regulate morality at the federal level implies a
federal police power. Until DOMA, it was generally understood that
no such federal police power existed. According to the constitutional
principles of limited government, police powers are left to the states.
The Supreme Court emphasized this principle in its recent holding in
United States v. Lopez.380
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez, the Commerce
Clause had been widely used to justify congressional power to intrude
into areas traditionally within the exclusive domain of the states.3 8 '
The Lopez decision marked the first time in more than sixty years that
the Court concluded Congress had exceeded its power under the Com-
merce Clause. 38 2 The statute, the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990,
which made it a federal offense for an individual to possess a firearm
in a school zone, was struck down. The Court held that an insufficient
nexus connected the possession of a firearm and interstate com-
merce. 38 3 As a result, the statute was invalid as an unconstitutional
exercise of the congressional commerce power because it did not con-
cern the regulation of economic activity. The Court reasoned that up-
holding the statute ultimately would grant Congress a limitless power
to legislate under the Commerce Clause.3S4 "[I]t is difficult to perceive
377. Id. (finding of fact no. 125).
378. Id. ("Gay and lesbian parents and [same-gender] couples can provide children
with a nurturing relationship and a nurturing environment which is conducive to
the development of happy, healthy and well-adjusted children.").
379. Johnson, supra note 74, at 47.
380. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
381. See Victoria Davis, Note, A Landmark Lost: The Anemic Impact of United States
v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), on the Federalization of Criminal Law, 75 NEB.
L. REv. 117, 118 (1996).
382. Id. at 118-19.
383. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
384. See id. at 563-64, 566.
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any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law
enforcement or education where States historically have been sover-
eign."3 8 5 If the Court accepted the statute as a valid exercise of con-
gressional power under the Commerce Clause, it would be "hard-
pressed to post any activity by an individual that Congress is without
the power to regulate."38 6
Growing from this concept of federalism has been the recognition
that Congress must respect areas traditionally reserved to the states
and refrain from legislating without a truly national purpose. Areas
in which state authority traditionally has been superior to federal au-
thority include activities that "in the ordinary course of affairs, con-
cern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal
order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.'"38 7 Family law and
domestic relations frequently are invoked as the paradigmatic areas
in which states have reserved power. Key to the Court's holding in
Lopez was the recognition that the Constitution does not cede a police
power to the federal government.3 88
DOMA attempts to invoke federal police powers under the guise of
protecting state sovereignty and is little more than a policy that is in
effect, a "'No Queers' sign writ large."38 9 If Colorado can have no such
sign without infringing on constitutional protections, surely the same
can be said when the federal government posts such a sign.3 90
VII. CONCLUSION
Very real consequences are associated with bans on same-gender
marriages. The subjugation of gay men and lesbian women dilutes or
defeats their incentive to productively participate in society. To be
productive citizens, homosexuals must assert themselves in a main-
stream that rejects them. Those willing to accept this challenge are
accused of demanding acceptance or even "special rights."
To be productive citizens, homosexuals bear great risks.391 Some
must lie to keep their jobs, others live in daily fear of being "found
out." With success comes an even greater fear that everything that
one has worked so hard to achieve may be taken away if an employer
discovers the true nature of the employee's family. Homosexuals bear
385. Id. at 564.
386. Id.
387. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)(citation omitted).
388. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566-67 (1995).
389. See Amar, supra note 129, at 207 (characterizing Colorado's Amendment Two as
a "No Queers sign writ large").
390. Cf id.
391. "The choice about whether to 'come out of the closet' can be of unsurpassed signif-
icance to homosexuals, since doing so can entail enormous social and economic
disadvantages, while declining to do so can exact an enormous price in fulfillment
and self-esteem." TRIBE, supra note 29, at 1434.
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an equal share of the burden for the welfare of society, yet their contri-
butions are not rewarded equally.
To take responsibility for their children, gays and lesbians face ob-
stacles designed to make such responsibility extremely difficult. In
most states, homosexuals are prevented from taking formal responsi-
bility for the children they are raising through custody and adoption
rights. The price is paid by the children who are denied the same se-
curity and opportunities to flourish and prosper as granted to other
children. When a gay or lesbian parent pleads for the right to protect
his or her family, the plea is characterized as a demand for acceptance
or "special rights."
The reality of the treatment of homosexuals at the hands of the
majority stands in stark contrast to the interests that serve a func-
tional society. On a daily basis, politicians and citizens lament the
dysfunction of unemployed individuals who do not take responsibility
or provide for their children and who rely on the government and tax-
payers for support. On the other hand, politicians and citizens force
gays and lesbians to go to great lengths to succeed at work and to
honor their family commitments, without support from government or
society. Instead, gays and lesbians face obstacles placed in their path
and designed to cut them off from participation in family relation-
ships. How can incentives that perpetuate dysfunction by making it
more difficult to obtain work or care for one's children and family
serve any legitimate public purpose?
Ultimately, bans on same-gender marriages contravene the very
objectives they supposedly serve.
Justice Brennan... concluded that "homosexuals have historically been the
object of pernicious and sustained hostility, and it is fair to say that the dis-
crimination against homosexuals is 'likely... to reflect deep-seated prejudice
rather than... rationality.'"
Wholly unfounded, degrading stereotypes about lesbians and gay men
abound in American society .... [Tihese attitudes about gay people reflect
"prejudice and antipathy" against gay people, because they do not conform to
the mainstream. The stereotypes have no basis in reality and represent out-
moded notions about homosexuality .... The fact that a person is lesbian or
gay bears no relation to the person's ability to contibute [sic] to society.
Rather than somehow being enemies of American culture and values, lesbians
and gay men occupy positions in all walks of American life, participate in di-
verse aspects of family life, and contribute enormously to many elements of
American culture.3 92
392. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1369-
70 (N.D. Cal. 1987)(citations omitted), rev'd in part, vacated in part by High Tech
Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 581 (9th Cir. 1990).
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